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ABSTRACT 
Currently there exisits no Joint doctrine to help commanders plan and coordinate 
the complex tasks of urban operations. Proposed Joint doctrine, JP3-06 DRAFT, 
attempts to alleviate this shortfall by providing commanders a framework and list of 
required operational capabilities to work with in the complex urban environment and 
states, "The complexity of urban terrain and the presence of noncombatants may combine 
to erode the effectiveness of current operational capabilities." The purpose of this thesis 
is to analyze the relevance of the proposed Joint doctrine's required operational 
capabilities (ROC): Command, Control and Communications (C3); Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); Fires; Maneuver; and Force Protection. The 
thesis attempts to determine if these are the key requirements for planning and executing 
successful urban operations. Successful combat operations are defined by doctrine as the 
fighting force maintaining a combat effective strength of seventy percent and the 
capability of conducting follow on missions. This thesis will analyze four case studies to 
determine the most critical elements for successfully planning and executing urban 
operations. It will then compare those elements against the proposed Joint doctrine's 
required operationalcapabilities in order to determine the relevance of the ROC's. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
As long as urban areas were small, or could be 
easily bypassed, there was little reason to 
consider an urban kind of military theater. 
Under the changing importance of urban areas and 
the growing extent of cities and suburbs, 
however, it does seem useful not only to 
distinguish this type of environment but to 
characterize its specific effect on military 
strategy (Peltier and Pearcy, 1966, p. 119) 
Currently the US military is not prepared to fight and 
win in an efficient or effective manner on tomorrow's 
battlefield. The US Army's MOUT (Military Operations on 
Urban Terrain) doctrine is almost 20 years old and fails to 
address the dynamic trends of recent urban battles. Also, 
the proper TTP's (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) for 
soldiers of all branches to fight in urban environments is 
virtually non-existent. Although we plan to fight as a 
Joint force, no Joint tactical manual exists at present for 
our commanders to plan and coordinate the complex tasks 
associated with Urban Operations. 
Proposed Joint doctrine, JP3-06 Operational Concept 
for Joint Urban Operations, attempts to alleviate this 
shortfall by providing commanders a framework and list of 
required operational capabilities to work with in the 
complex urban environment. It states that "The complexity 
of urban terrain and the presence of noncombatants may 
combine to erode the effectiveness of current operational 
capabilities. 11 The purpose of this thesis is to analyze 
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Protection. The thesis attempts to determine if these are 
the key requirements for planning and executing successful 
urban operations. Successful combat operations are defined 
by doctrine as the fighting force maintaining a combat 
effective strength of seventy percent and the capability of 
conducting follow on missions. 
Why is it so important to develop our ability to 
conduct successful urban operations? Aside from the opinion 
of many experts that urban conflict is inevitable due to 
the rise of urban populations, the most relevant factor 
suggesting the inevitability of urban conflict is the 
asymmetric advantages gained by the defender. The most 
notable advantages provided to the defender are the 
reduction of the US's superiority in maneuver, C3, and 
firepower, and the exploitation of the aversion of U.S. 
forces to cause collateral damage or civilian casual ties. 
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Ironically these asymmetric advantages represent many of 
the ROC's that Joint doctrine deems critical to successful 
urban combat. 
These advantages led one former adversary to change 
their national defense strategy. Following the invasion of 
Grenada, the Nicaraguan national defense strategy, which 
was based on traditional principles of conventional war, 
was dramatically revised. First, Nicaragua's Defense 
Minister Humberto Ortega recognized that his forces could 
not militarily defeat the US on an open battlefield. 
Second, knowing that the US would attack with overwhelming 
force, Humberto said, "We must resist as long as possible 
knowing how to attack, but also how to conserve our 
forces ... We are going to make Managua the Stalingrad of 
Nicaragua" (Miranda, 1993, p. 228). The new national 
defense policy of Nicaragua outlined two high priorities 
regarding American soldiers: 
To kill as many as possible in urban combat and 
to capture many who could then be used in 
negotiating better conditions for the departure 
of the rest. As Humberto said, 'make each city 
the gringos capture a Pyrrhic victory for them, 
both from the political as well as the military 
points of view [SCI]' (Miranda, 1993, p. 229) 
With this documented past case in mind and in light of 
recent conflicts from Mogadishu to Serbia, the US can no 
3 
longer expect its enemies to meet them on an open 
battlefield. Desert Storm sent clear and decisive signals 
to the world that the US is the technical master of 
conventional maneuver warfare and the dominant world power. 
Hence, our future enemies may well utilize their urban 
centers, as the Nicaraguans planned, to reduce our 
technological and maneuver advantages in an attempt to bog 
down US forces in the high casualty producing urban 
environment in order to weaken US resolve. 
These asymmetric advantages will drive our enemies to 
attempt to draw the US into urban combat. Historically 
urban warfare has caused the highest casualty rates among 
combatants in modern warfare, as well as horrendous 
civilian casualties. The battle for Stalingrad during 
World War II clearly demonstrated the horrors of urban 
combat with units loosing over 50% of their combat 
strength. 
In Stalingrad, the 95th Rifle Division arrived in 
the city in late September 1942 with a strength 
of approximately 7, 000 men. By 8 October the 
division had 3, 075 men remaining; on 14 October 
the division was evacuated with roughly 500 men. 
The 37th Guards Rifle Division arrived the night 
of 2-3 October 1942 with 7,000 men and was 
removed from fighting in the tractor factory on 
15 October. Strength when evacuated was 250 men 
(Glenn, 1996, p. 2). 
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These historically high casualties present the US with 
a serious manpower problem due in part to the recent draw 
down. Joint doctrine is attempting to outline an 
operational framework and ROC for planning and executing 
urban operations in hope of reducing the high number of 
combat troops necessary to conduct urban operations. This 
thesis will analyze the proposed Joint doctrine to 
determine if the stated ROC's will truly enhance the 
commanders' abilities to plan and fight in an urban 
environment. 
This thesis will test the relevance of the five ROC's 
against four case studies and determine the most critical 
elements for successfully planning and executing urban 
operations. The criteria for analysis will follow Army 
doctrine by assigning a Trained (T) status for units that 
successfully execute the ROCi a Practice (P) status for 
units that met the critical tasks associated with the ROC 1 
but still require further training to meet all tasksi and 
an Untrained (U) for units that failed any critical tasks 
associated with the ROC. 
The following abridged definitions outline the tasks 
associated with each ROC: 
Command, Control and Communications (C3) -Command 
and control procedures and systems must be 
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flexible and adaptive to account for the 
uncertainty inherent in combat. Command and 
control systems must adapt readily to urban 
terrain. Communication devices must function in 
multi-dimensional urban surroundings ensuring 
reliable communications between the headquarters 
and tactical command posts that may be mobile. 
We must overcome the restrictions urban terrain 
imposes upon the ability of component commanders 
to monitor and direct the activities of 
subordinates. Joint forces must be able to 
navigate with precision and report locations in 
three-dimensions. Communications networks of 
sufficient bandwidth must be available, and 
solutions to the communications interference 
unique to the urban environment must be found. 
Movement and Maneuver- Dominant maneuver in 
future urban operations will call for the 
capability to move combat power rapidly through 
three-dimensional urban terrain. Surface 
movement includes not only conventional methods 
of negotiating roads and reducing obstacles, but 
also the means to create new lines of 
communications or avenues of approach through 
structures, which might be fully or partially 
intact. Sub-surface movement will exploit urban 
subterranean infrastructure. Super-surface 
movement will allow joint forces to create and 
use lines of communications· and avenues of 
approach via the upper stories of buildings. 
Vertical movement will be conducted between the 
surface, sub-surface, and super-surface zones. 
Finally, mobility in future urban operations will 
include air movement by assault support aircraft. 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR)- The ability of the Joint Force Commander, 
or any unit involved in urban operations to both 
sense the battlespace and to accurately assess 
information regarding the terrain and presence of 
friendly, enemy, and noncombatant personnel is 
vital. The real key to ISR in urban operations 
is HUMINT, with its many origins, placing great 
emphasis on linguistic skills and cultural 
perception. Sensors should provide for three-
dimensional interior rendering, with the 
capability to display, store, and transfer 
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information between units. Other systems should 
provide a capability for remote interior sensing, 
perhaps using equipment mounted on aircraft, or 
even in space. 
Fires- The nature of urban terrain presents 
challenges in employing fires. Limited 
visibility affects targeting, fire support 
coordination, and battle damage assessment. Tall 
structures become intervening crests for surface-
delivered fires. The cover afforded by the 
terrain affects penetration characteristics and 
fuse functioning, reducing weapons effects below 
the threshold for successful engagement. The 
fire support system must adapt by providing for 
target locations and designation in three-
dimensional terms, extremely precise ordnance 
delivery (e.g. to a specific room in a building) 
munitions with variable penetration and explosive 
characteristics, and the coordination of lethal 
and non-lethal fires against different targets 
near one another. Firepower must be available 
for highly accurate longer-range engagements, yet 
be affordable enough to be available for high 
volume interdiction fires to support the joint 
forces. 
Force Protection- Real time awareness of the 
location and activities of all elements of the 
joint force, to include special operations 
forces, is essential in minimizing fratricide. 
Joint forces will use force protection measures 
adapted for future urban operations to facilitate 
maneuver with reduced risk of casualties. 
Individual equipment and measures such as combat 
identification, combined with collective 
protection efforts might serve to lower the 
incidence of some types of casualties. 
Protective measures required for full dimensional 
protection in future urban operations also 
include special medical capabilities. 
Individuals might be wounded while in locations 
from which it is difficult to evacuate them. 
Systems must be in place to provide for prompt 
and effective care of the wounded under such 
challenging circumstances (Sumner, 1999, pp. 8-
10) . 
7 
While these definitions may be broad in nature, they 
do provide the necessary framework to conduct the critical 
analysis of the case studies. This analysis will determine 
if the ROC's are relevant to conducting successful urban 
combat. Finally, I will discuss the utility of Joint 
doctrine's required operational capabilities, discuss their 
limitations, and make recommendations for future research. 
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II THE BATTLE FOR SUEZ CITY 
Best policy in war-thwart the enemy's strategy, 
Second best-disrupt his alliances through 
diplomacy, 
Third best-attack his army in the field, 
Worst strategy-attack walled cities. 
(Sun Tsu, The Art of War) 
THE HORRORS OF URBAN COMBAT 
The battle for Suez City, during the Yom Kippur War 
1973, Pitted two modern well trained armies against one 
another in an urban environment. The Israelis were 
generally trained, organized and equipped along Western 
lines, while the Egyptians were trained, organized, and 
equipped along Soviet lines. What caused the Israelis to 
blunder into Suez City? The limited time available to plan 
the mission before the execution led to the poor 
application of the principles of the Required Operational 
Capabilities (ROC's) C3, ISR, and Fires. While the overall 
significance of this battle had little to do with the 
outcome of the war, the battle reiterated to the world the 
horrors of urban combat and provided valuable lessons on 
how not to conduct offensive urban operations. 
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Prior to analyzing these failures in detail, let us 
briefly examine the events leading up to the battle for 
Suez City as well as a description of the city itself. 
BACKGROUND 
Prior to the war, Suez City had a population of about 
250,000 and was itself an industrial center with numerous 
plants and oil refineries. The city occupied approximately 
fifteen square miles in area and to this day is 
strategically located on the northern banks of the Gulf of 
Suez, commanding the entrance to the Suez Canal. Two major 
railway lines bisect the city paralleled by two divided 
highways running east to west and north to south. At the 
time of the battle, the city consisted of buildings from 
two to five stories tall as well as a few high-rises 
densely packed into the downtown area. In all respects, 
the city presented a major obstacle to any enemy offensive 
operations (Adan, 1980, pp. 409-410). 
Following the Six Day War of 1967, the Israelis 
occupied the territories of Suez, West Bank and Gaza in 
order to secure their borders against future Arab threats. 
The Arabs suffered a humiliating defeat for which they 
planned atonement. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was the 
Arabs grasp at retribution for the egregious defeat that 
they suffered by Israeli hands. Initially the Israelis 
were caught off guard at the onset of the war and suffered 
several defeats that greatly threatened Israel's future 
existence. Had the Egyptians continued to maintain the 
initiative, they possibly could have re-conquered all of 
Sinai and threatened Israel's southern border. The 
Egyptians, however, deliberately employed a limited 
strategy aimed at regaining the Suez Canal. This strategy 
failed to exploit their initial success and allowed the 
Israelis the opportunity to regroup and launch a successful 
counter-offensive. The daring and bold move by the Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF) to cross the Suez Canal caught the 
Egyptian Army flatfooted and led to the Egyptian Third Army 
being surrounded by the IDF. From the twentieth to twenty-
third of October, Israeli forces under the command of 
General Adan were mopping up Egyptian forces and captured 
over 8,000 POWs. The overall premise was that the Egyptian 
Army was in total retreat, providing only token resistance 
to slow the Israeli advance 
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PLANNING THE BATTLE FOR SUEZ CITY 
General Adan was able to surround Suez City by the 
evening of 23 October, sealing off the Egyptian Third 
Army's escape route. In an attempt for total victory, 
General Adan requested permission from his superior, 
General Gonen, to attack Suez City. General Gonen told 
him, "if it is to be a Benghazi, yes; but if it is to be a 
Stalingrad, no" (O'Ballance, 1978, p. 258). 
words, if it is well defended do not attack. 
In other 
The second 
cease-fire was due to take effect the following morning at 
0700 hours; therefore, General Adan opted for a hasty 
attack commencing at 0530 hours against what he presumed to 
be a lightly defended city (Adan, 1980, pp. 400-425). 
General Adan's decision to attack so soon seems 
misguided, because conducting successful urban combat 
requires detailed planning and support. Executing a 
successful hasty attack requires a great deal of 
intelligence and coordination. First, detailed knowledge 
of the enemy's location and disposition are imperative to 
conducting a successful hasty attack. Second, sufficient 
coordination between units must be conducted to ensure 
proper execution. If either of these tasks is glossed 
over, the probability of success is significantly 
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diminished. The Israelis lacked the knowledge of the 
enemy's disposition and lacked the necessary coordination 
and support between their units. These shortcomings 
coupled with the defenders asymmetric advantages gained in 
an urban environment greatly reduced the probability of 
conducting a successful urban attack. As Sun Tsu aptly 
points out in the above quote, the worst strategy is to 
attack walled cities; however, the Israelis demonstrated 
that an even worse strategy is to conduct hasty attacks 
against walled cities. 
Israel's haste in planning the operation led to 
failures in several critical operational capabilities. The 
most crucial failures were in Command, Control and 
Communications (C3), and Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR). Command and control was complicated 
by the arrival of new units that had never worked together, 
resulting in an uncoordinated attack that left hundreds of 
soldiers cut off by enemy units. The pressure to seek a 
quick victory prior to the enforcement of the negotiated 
cease-fire did not allow General Adan to conduct proper ISR 
operations, resulting in the tragic loss of over eighty 
soldiers and numerous tanks and armored vehicles. The 
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Israelis' failure to conduct proper ISR operations 
constituted a fundamental tactical error. 
As noted above, in order to conduct a hasty attack 
successfully, knowledge of the location and disposition of 
enemy forces is required, especially in an urban 
environment where offensive operations are more difficult. 
Therefore, one would expect that a great deal of 
reconnaissance and planning were conducted prior to the 
assault. This, however, was not the case. As General Adan 
states, 
The entire operation was in the nature of a last-
minute, grab-what-you-can action .. A proper attack 
requires considerable preparation. In this case, 
all my infantry was separated and far from the 
tank brigades that were bivouacked near Suez City 
(Adan, 1980, pp. 410-411). 
Less than twelve hours elapsed from the time preparations 
began to the launching of the initial assault, with the 
required infantry units arriving only hours prior to the 
assault. Why did General Adan knowingly violate proper 
preparations needed to successfully capture Suez City? 
There seems to have been little pressure from higher 
headquarters to press the advantage and, in fact, General 
Gonen directed General Adan not to attack Suez if it was to 
be a Stalingrad. In General Adan's book, On the Banks of 
the Suez, it shows that he became fixated on the 
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destruction of the Egyptian Third Army. He continually had 
his forces conducting what he termed "mopping up 
operations" in an effort to cause the cease-fire to fail, 
allowing him to continue the attack. Adan states, "At 
about midnight I informed Gonen that since the cease-fire 
was not being observed, I was going to continue fighting on 
the following day. I added that I did not expect the 
cease-fire . to be enforced" (Adan, 1980, p. 402). By 
rushing his attack prior to the implementation of the 
cease-fire, General Adan doomed his forces to needless 
slaughter in the horrors of urban combat. 
THE ASSAULT ON SUEZ CITY 
General Adan planned for the initial assault to begin 
at 0530 hours on 24 October with a massive artillery and 
air bombardment; however, poor weather and the adoption of 
the cease-fire limited the air attack to only four 
squadrons, hardly the amount of close air support required 
for the operation. General Adan planned for his two 
brigades to launch a simultaneous attack against the city's 
center and industrial base. The attack, however, lacked 
coordination and soon broke down into two separate assaults 
with Gabi's brigade meeting little resistance in the 
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industrial area and Aryeh's brigade being delayed by enemy 
ambushes along the approach to the city. This delay, along 
with the lack of supporting fire, allowed the Third Army to 
concentrate its efforts against Aryeh's brigade once it 
entered the city. Aryeh reported to Adan that, "The 
picture is not yet clear," and requested more supporting 
fire to cover his forces (Adan, 1980, p. 414). Aryeh 
subsequently initiated his assault without proper 
preparations or regard for the combined arms approach 
necessary to conduct urban operations. The infantry 
battalion that was transferred to his command was delayed 
and instead of postponing the attack he assaulted the city 
with his armored battalion. The results of the initial 
assault into the city were horrendous. The soldiers in the 
mounted, armored column were sitting ducks for the well-
positioned Egyptian forces and the following onslaught 
began: 
When the column reached the Arba'in junction, it 
came under a withering blast of fire. 
Simultaneously it was hit by flat trajectory fire 
from guns, antitank missiles, hand grenades 
thrown from balconies, and by bursts of automatic 
fire leveled at them by Egyptian soldiers who 
suddenly leaped out from the buildings. Within 
minutes nearly all the commanders were hit. In 
the entire battalion only four officers were left 
who could function; all the rest were slouched 
over in their turrets, dead or wounded. Control 
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of the battalion was lost, the radio net jammed 
by too many cries for help (Adan, 1980, p. 414). 
In a little over one hour, all the vehicles of the 
lead battalion were hit with only a few of the follow on 
armored vehicles able to withdraw from the carnage of the 
Egyptian's kill-zone. In the melee that followed, the 
armored vehicles abandoned their infantry soldiers in a 
desperate effort for survival. Once the ambush was 
initiated, the infantry forces dismounted and under 
withering enemy fire were forced to take up defensive 
positions within several buildings. Isolated and cut off, 
these forces fought desperately throughout the day and into 
the night with only a couple hundred successfully making it 
back under the cover of darkness to friendly lines. 
General Adan stated that the price he paid for the abortive 
attack was "appalling: 80 killed or missing, about 120 
wounded.~ and 28 armored vehicles destroyed (Adan, 1980, p. 
422) . 
After this battle, another cease-fire was brokered, 
and this time it was due to take effect by 0700 hours on 25 
October. However, the Israelis once again engaged Egyptian 
forces prior to the UN observers' occupation of the 
territory. The final assault to capture Suez City was 
launched at 0800 hours with a squadron of tanks supported 
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by infantry, but this force too was repelled by the well-
entrenched Egyptian forces. The fighting cost the Israelis 
another 10 tanks with numerous casualties. In total, the 
hastily, ill- prepared attacks on Suez City cost the 
Israelis a personnel loss of 68 officers, 23 pilots, 373 
soldiers killed or wounded, and a materiel loss of 38 
armored vehicles destroyed (O'Ballance, 1978, p. 2 62) • 
While Israeli forces suffered tremendous losses, the 
Egyptians' losses were reported as light. General Adan 
expressed his disappointment in the cease-fire as 
unfortunate because he was unable to finish the job (Adan, 
1980, p. 425). Perhaps it was this incredible fixation to 
destroy his enemy that clouded his judgment and rushed him 
into the fatal assaults on Suez City. 
THE PLANNING PROCESS 
Time is perhaps the most valuable asset in planning 
military operations and is usually in short supply. In 
this particular case, events seemed to have overtaken 
reason in the preparation for the assault on Suez City. 
The impending cease-fire drove the Israelis to conduct a 
risky, hasty attack on the city. 
Adan states, 
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In retrospect, General 
I regret that the mission was assigned, and even 
more that I did not object to i t ... The capture of a 
city is always a complicated operation. A city 
offers many advantages to a defender, enabling 
him to put up stiff resistance in house-to-house 
fighting. So the conquest of a city always 
involves a good deal of fighting, takes time, and 
results in substantial losses (Adan, 1980, pp. 
427-428). 
Had a proper analysis of the situation been conducted, I 
believe that General Adan, in his own words noted above, 
should have rejected the mission due to insufficient time 
to prepare for the complexities of urban combat (Adan, 
1980, pp. 426-430). 
LACK OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
The Israelis suffered from serious problems within 
their C3, ISR, and fire support operational capabilities. 
First, let us examine the problems with command, control 
and communications. As General Adan stated, capturing a 
city is a complex operation; therefore, the need for 
efficient and effective command, control, and 
communications is increased. One would expect that due to 
these complexities, General Adan would focus his command on 
this operation; however, he was conducting simultaneous 
operations with his division that divided his efforts and 
ability to control events. Besides capturing Suez City, 
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General Adan was charged with mopping up the West Bank's 
greenbelt, seizing the ramparts in his sector, cutting off 
the Third Army's water supply, and seizing a bridge to 
enable the IDF to cross the canal. These missions alone 
constitute a serious command and control problem not to 
mention taking on a new task of capturing a city. Command 
and control was further complicated by the attachment of 
non-organic infantry who were rushed to the division in 
support of the assault. These forces had insufficient time 
to regroup and coordinate with the armored forces prior to 
the assault, hindering command and control. The result was 
disastrous and their inevitable extraction cost the lives 
of numerous soldiers. Also, the air bombardment, which 
lasted approximately thirty minutes, hardly provided the 
amount of preparatory fire necessary to reduce the 
Egyptians' defenses, and completely failed to cover the 
initial assault into the city that took place nearly two 
hours following the bombardment. These forces lacked the 
training to conduct combined operations and had never 
worked together prior to this operation. Once the battle 
ensued, their lack of integration became painfully apparent 
as they failed to support the armored assault and were soon 
cut off and surrounded. 
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In order to properly command and control events, 
commanders rely on effective communications. Urban 
environments impose serious communications problems such as 
the screening effect of buildings that block radio 
communications. This screening effect caused delays in 
communications and loss of control. The Israelis lost 
contact with Aryeh's brigade following the onslaught due to 
Egyptian jamming, screening effect, and poor communications 
discipline (Adan, 1980, pp416-417). Cordesman and Wagner 
stated that, 
Israeli C3 experienced severe problems. Assets 
were not well organized, secure or given proper 
regional or central battle management. The 
communications gear was of moderate quality at 
best ... On a number of occasions, communications 
broke down and senior commanders lost track of 
what their subordinate units were doing 
(Cordesman, Wagner, 1990, p. 49). 
The lack of effective communications reduced General 
Adan's ability to coordinate the operation and provide 
effective counter-fires to cover the withdrawal of the 
besieged infantry. Overall, Israelis' poor communications 
inhibited command and control, resulting in numerous 
casualties. 
The ·inability of the commander to focus his division 
on the critical task of seizing the city, to properly 
integrate his forces prior to the assault, or to establish 
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effective communications led to the breakdown of C3, 
resulting in numerous casualties and mission failure. 
The lack of ISR operations also significantly led to 
high casualties sustained in the conflict. In fact, had a 
proper Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) 
been conducted General Adan would have seen that Suez City 
was heavily defended and that an attack would violate the 
guidance that he should not attack if it was to be a 
Stalingrad. In fact, the operation had no significant 
impact on the overall war, as General Adan stated, "In my 
view, the capture of Suez City could not have contributed 
to the encirclement operation itself ... [or] to the surrender 
of the Third Army'' (Adan, 1980, p. 426). By simply sending 
a scout platoon to reconnoiter the area, General Adan could 
have developed a clear picture of Egyptian defenses and 
advised General Gonen against the assault. The fact that 
the simple and tactically sound procedure of conducting 
reconnaissance was ignored due to the pressures of a 
pending cease-fire directly led to this disastrous attack 
and cost the Israelis dearly. Why did the Israelis follow 
up the attack on the proceeding day when it was clear that 
the city was heavily defended and violated the commander's 
guidance? This attack cost the Israelis another 10 armored 
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vehicles and over 100 casualties without any tactical 
gains. This clearly demonstrates a breakdown in the 
critical operational capabilities of C3 and ISR operations. 
The combination of poor maneuver techniques and the lack of 
supporting fires led to the disastrous assault. General 
Adan' s assumption that the city would be lightly defended 
and the fact that he did not conduct reconnaissance 
operations led to his misapplication of the principle of 
mass, "the synchronization of all elements of combat power 
where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a 
short period of time" (FM 100-5). For example, fire 
support systems are one of the critical operational 
capabilities proposed by doctrine, and General Adan failed 
to properly synchronize and prioritize his fires, leaving 
his assault force vulnerable to enemy fires. Poor maneuver 
techniques such as those utilized by the IDF to attack the 
city in a mounted column formation led to the deaths and 
serious injury of nearly every officer in the lead 
battalion. The operational capability of fire support was 
clearly violated as insufficient fires were brought to bear 
on the target to either reduce the enemy or to cover the 
initial assault, resulting in horrendous casualties. This 
lack of a combined arms approach led to the destruction of 
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over half the armored force and the isolation of the 
infantry battalions in less than one hour. 
General Adan excused his approach of utilizing an 
armored thrust into the city by arguing that he expected 
little resistance, assuming that a massive show of force 
would overwhelm the enemy. One can see that a massive show 
of force is no substitute for a well planned and 
synchronized combined arms assault (Adan, 1980, pp. 428-
430) . 
CONCLUSION 
The above analysis identifies failures in the critical 
operational capabilities of C3, ISR, fire support, and the 
poor tactical maneuvering of forces as the causes for this 
operation's failure. Also, the fact that the decision to 
launch the mission was hastily executed compounded these 
problems and resulted in numerous casualties and deaths. 
General Adan's attack plan was based on the assumption that 
the city was lightly defended and that the Egyptian Army 
was on the brink of collapse. There were also self-imposed 
time pressures of securing the city prior to the 
implementation of the cease-fire affecting the preparations 
for the mission. 
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Poor tactics led to high casualties and the ultimate 
failure to seize the city. Tactically, the principle of 
movement and maneuver was clearly violated by dividing the 
division to conduct numerous missions, rather than focusing 
on moving combat power through the treacherous urban 
terrain. Synchronization was hindered by the late arrival 
of the infantry forces; the early withdraw of the air 
bombardment, and the lack of supporting fires to cover the 
assault. 
In the heat of battle, General Adan seems to have been 
caught up in the momentum of Israel's overall success, 
which rushed him into executing the hasty attack without 
regard for the need for proper ISR operations. 
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III THE SIEGE OF BEIRUT 1982 
We will not reply ... in words. Our reply shall be 
couched in terms of lead ... In roar of shell and 
shrapnel and in whine of machine guns will our 
answer be couched. 
(Jack London in The Iron Heel) 
Following months of border attacks and artillery duels 
during the spring of 1982 between the Israelis and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces, the 
Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched an invasion into 
Lebanon in order to stop the PLO attacks. During the 
opening day of the invasion, Israeli forces once again 
found themselves confronted with the thorny task of urban 
combat. The initial results were just as disastrous at the 
city of Tyre, the first urban center encountered during the 
war, as they were during Suez City: 
... The lead battalion lost its way, and instead of 
bypassing the city and putting a blocking force 
in place, it stumbled right into the city and 
into a PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] 
ambush. Trying to back out, it stumbled into yet 
another ambush. The result was a number of 
casualties, and the battalion commander and an 
enlisted man taken prisoner; later they would be 
tortured and executed and their bodies thrown in 
a well (Gabriel, 1984, p. 83). 
Not wanting a repeat of high casualties seen during the 
Suez City operation or the more recent debacle in Tyre, the 
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Israelis opted for a different approach when attacking 
Beirut. 
Following the Israeli request for Syrian forces to 
withdraw from Beirut, the Israelis launched one of their 
most devastating bombardments of the city, with an 
estimated 250 killed and 900 wounded. War corespondents 
Eric Silver and James McManus for the Guardian reported on 
June 12, 1982, 
A few minutes before the mid-day cease-fire, 
during the heaviest bombing raid on Beirut since 
the invasion began six days ago, Israeli jets 
pounded a Palestinian neighborhood in the 
southern suburbs, bringing down a six-story 
building (reportedly housing al-Fatah 
headquarters) and damaging dozens of 
others ... During the raid, Israeli gunboats 
inexplicably shelled civilian areas of Muslim 
Beirut bringing terror to the shopping area ... 
So the stage was set for the upcoming battle for Beirut 
where the Israelis continually chose long range precision 
fires over the grueling house to house fighting of urban 
combat. 
BACKGROUND 
From the 1970's to early 1980's, the PLO entrenched 
themselves in Lebanon and stepped up their terrorist 
attacks against the Israelis. Numerous exchanges of 
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artillery fire echoed along Israel's northern border 
between the PLO and Israeli Defense Force (IDF), with 
terrible casualties sustained by the civilian population. 
In the months preceding Israel's invasion, the PLO also 
launched several border raids against civilian targets to 
include schools and busses. Following these attacks, a 
tenuous cease-fire was brokered. The PLO stepped up its 
attacks overseas, killing 15 and wounding 250 Jews from 
July 1981 to June 1982 (Sharon, 1989, pp. 431-433). These 
devastating attacks began to take their toll on the Israeli 
administration. The Israeli Cabinet planned to retaliate 
following several terrorist attacks in March and April in 
order to deliver a knockout blow to PLO forces should the 
PLO refuse to cease its hostilities against Israelis. 
Israelis did not have to wait long, as the PLO attempted to 
assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Great Britain on 3 
June 1982, igniting the fuse to the invasion. On June 4, 
the Israeli airforce launched its heaviest attacks on 
Beirut since the cease-fire, attacking military targets in 
and around Beirut in response to the assassination attempt. 
Prime Minister Begin's press secretary, Uri Porat, stated, 
"Israel's action today ended a long period in which Israel 
showed restraint, and with this murderous attack Israel 
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could not but act in the way it did" (Claiborne, 1982, p. 
A1). The PLO replied to this attack on June 5, with heavy 
artillery attacks along the northern border towns in 
Israel. These attacks sealed the decision to invade and 
orders were sent on the evening of June 5 for the IDF to 
attack on the following day (Gabriel, 1984, pp. 61-62). 
The Israelis deployed over six divisions for the 
invasion and were faced by two Syrian divisions and 15,000 
PLO soldiers (Gabriel, pp. 80-81). Once the Israelis 
maneuvered into positions sealing off Beirut, they were 
faced by one Syrian brigade and three light battalions 
positioned south of the airport, two Syrian brigades 
augmented with ten light battalions positioned along the 
Beirut-Damascus highway, and between 12,000-14,000 PLO 
soldiers in and around Beirut (Gabriel, 1984. pp. 107-109, 
132) . The Israeli forces greatly outnumbered their foes 
and had established complete air superiority by the end of 
June; thus setting the stage for the siege of Beirut. 
Beirut City is the capital of Lebanon and is a complex 
urban center that sprawls over approximately five square 
miles. To the north and west the city is bordered by the 
Mediterranean Sea, and to the south and east by steep hills 
and mountains that surround the city. The city is 
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geographically divided into eastern and western sectors by 
the Beirut River that runs south to north. Demographically 
the city was divided into two regions, with the Muslims 
controlling the western portion of the city and the 
Christians controlling the eastern section. The population 
was estimated at one million in 1982, with an estimated 
500,000 still remaining at the beginning of the siege. The 
downtown area in the western section, consisting of Western 
style high-rises constructed with reinforced concrete, was 
typical of a modern, Western city. The eastern section 
contained fewer high-rises, consisting mainly of four to 
five story sandstone buildings. The streets throughout the 
city were wide enough to accommodate armored traffic, while 
the parks and steep slopes created numerous ambush sights 
along these high speed avenues of approach (Burton, pp. 71-
74) • 
OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE 
The initial planning for this operation started as far 
back as 1978, following Israel's unsuccessful Litani 
Operation that was supposed to reduce the PLO's military 
activity. The lessons of the Litani Operation were not 
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lost on the IDF. As Defense Minister Sharon stated, " ... to 
effectively deal with the PLO in southern Lebanon something 
more than a simple retaliation exercise, even a large one 
would be required" (Sharon, 1989, p. 425). The result of 
this planning led to the adoption of the Oranim Plan. Key 
to this plan was the first stated objective of the overall 
plan: "1. The main objective is the annihilation of the 
terrorist threat, i.e., the destruction of their military 
strength as well as their entire infrastructure, including 
in particular in Beirut" [emphasis mine] (Sharon, 1989, P. 
436). The objectives for this operation were clearly 
outlined and the plan was refined and briefed to all 
operational commanders by the Defense Minister himself. By 
properly preparing and planning for the operation, the IDF 
avoided the errors that were caused by the hastened attack 
on Suez City and greatly improved their success during the 
siege of Beirut. 
Due to the precise planning and coordination conducted 
prior to the invasion, the IDF met little resistance in the 
opening phase of the invasion. At the end of the third day 
of battle, the Israeli assault pushed to the outskirts of 
the Beirut airport in the west with the heaviest fighting 
coming in the cities of Tyre and Sidon. In the center of 
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the battlefield, the Israelis were able to outflank the 
Syrian divisions in the Bekaa Valley, destroying seventeen 
of nineteen SAM missile batteries, and over ninety Syrian 
aircraft while sustaining no losses themselves. The 
outcome of these battles was critical to the siege of 
Beirut as they ensured air supremacy and cut off Syrian 
forces in the Bekaa Valley from Beirut (Gabriel, 1984, pp. 
93-99). 
While the initial phase of the operation was able to 
attain all of its objectives, the succeeding weeks found 
the IDF making painfully slow gains against the Syrian 
forces defending the southern approaches to Beirut and 
along the Beirut-Damascus highway. Several cease-fires 
between Syria and Israel broke down, leading the IDF to 
launch a massive offensive on June 22, against Syrian 
positions along the highway in an attempt to drive them to 
northern edge of the Bekaa Valley. For four days the 
battle to control the highway raged with heavy losses on 
both sides. Eventually, the Syrians were forced to 
withdraw from the highway, thus sealing off the last high-
speed avenue of approach to the city. Now, the IDF was 
confronted with the hardest target of the war, Beirut City 
(Gabriel, 1984, pp. 101-112). 
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THE SIEGE OF BEIRUT 
Beirut presented the IDF with a tactical and strategic 
dilemma. First, how should the IDF eliminate the enemy 
forces from the city? Second, strategically the war was 
losing favor in Israel; therefore, the IDF could not accept 
high casualties as this would certainly split the Israeli 
people and could have long term disastrous effects on 
Israeli security. Defense Minister Sharon continually 
echoes these concerns in his biography: 
Arafat and his friends needed no one to point out 
how significant Israel's domestic political 
broils could be to their survival. Documents the 
IDF found in Beirut after the terrorists' 
expulsion told the story eloquently. 'The most 
important thing,' said a PLO chief in one 
recorded meeting, 'is to increase the 
demonstrations all over Israel ... ' Our only hope, ' 
said a third [chief], 'is in those demonstrations 
that are taking place in Tel Aviv' (Sharon, 1989, 
p. 483). 
The growing unrest at home and the need to keep 
casualties low led to a campaign of siege warfare. Up to 
this point over fifty percent of all casualties on the 
Israeli side occurred in the urban fighting in and around 
the cities of Tyre and Sidon, which were not nearly as 
complex obstacles as Beirut promised to be. Therefore, the 
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IDF employed a policy of siege warfare on Beirut while 
attempting to allow civilians a means of escape. 
Tactically, the IDF isolated Beirut in the initial phases 
of the operation as noted above. Also, tactical assaults 
were executed to secure key objectives such as the airport 
and other key lines of communications. While close 
quarters combat occurred during these assaults they were 
minimized to only strategic targets necessary to tighten 
the siege on Beirut or enhance the Israeli position at the 
bargaining table. As Gabriel states in his personal 
account of the siege: 
A second tactic was to minimize the risks to its 
own troops. The IDF would keep up the ground 
pressure on PLO strong points, but only at the 
small-unit level, heavily supported by artillery 
and tank fire ... The aim was, clearly, not to break 
through to the downtown areas, where the battle 
would become a free-for-all in which large 
numbers of casualties would be suffered. Rather, 
the intention was to engage the PLO at carefully 
selected strongpoints and break the PLO's will 
rather than forcing a military decision (p. 138). 
The majority of combat was conducted at long ranges from 
the precision fires of Israeli jets and direct-fired 
artillery, to massed fires of unguided bombs and indirect 
artillery fires. The latter caused enormous collateral 
damage and civilian casualties that the PLO then utilized 
to win the propaganda war, while the former reduced the 
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PLO's and Syrian's ability to fight and kept the initiative 
with the Israelis. 
Although the Israelis held the upper hand both 
tactically and strategically, their inability to counter 
the PLO's propaganda, depicting the IDF's siege bombardment 
as ruthless and indiscriminate, created great political 
pressures between the US and Israel. 
The duration of the siege was wearing on the IDF and 
the Israeli government. Negotiations were making little 
progress and cease-fire after cease-fire was being 
violated, with no immediate end in sight. Prime Minister 
Begin summed up the critical nature of the situation in a 
speech before the cabinet: 
Gentlemen, if we continue to remain at the gates 
of Beirut as we are doing now, we may bring 
disaster on oursel ves ... if we do not enter Beirut, 
the victory will be the PLO's. Arafat will claim 
that the PLO is alive in position, and 
armed.~entlemen, we are at a turning point that 
may lead to a national crisis (Sharon, 1989, p. 
486) • 
This speech led the IDF to step up its pressure on the 
PLO to withdraw from Beirut by increasing the bombardments 
against the city. These attacks further strained the 
political tensions between the US and Israel and President 
Reagan transmitted a harsh letter to Begin accusing the IDF 
of using disproportionate force causing the unnecessary 
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deaths of civilians, and warned Begin that the relationship 
between them was in the balance (Gabriel, 1984, p. 490). 
Despite these warnings, the Israelis continued to hold firm 
to their demands that all the terrorist forces withdraw 
from Beirut prior to an Israeli pull back. Realizing that 
time was not on his side, Sharon ordered a series of 
escalated attacks to secure strategic centers in Beirut and 
stepped up the artillery and air attacks against terrorist 
targets. These attacks seemed to have caused the 
negotiations to move forward, as Philip Habib, US 
negotiator, issued an ultimatum to Arafat, giving the PLO 
only forty-eight hours to accept the Israeli demands. At 
this, Arafat opted to save what forces he had and to spare 
Beirut any further destruction by accepting the agreement 
on 12 August (Sharon, 1989, pp. 490-492). 
Due to their ability to conduct a successful urban 
operation, the Israelis finally accomplished their major 
goal of eliminating the PLO from Lebanon. Incredibly, of 
the 35,000 Israeli ground forces involved in the siege of 
Beirut, only 88 soldiers were killed and another 750 
wounded, leaving the units at 97% mission capable 
[34,162/35,000] (Gabriel, 1984, p. 167). Clearly, this 
urban operation was a resounding military victory for the 
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IDF, and a major setback for the PLO and Syria. Was the 
Israeli success due to improvements made in the required 
operational capabilities or some other factors? 
REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
The Israelis made great improvements in their C3, 
which helped lead them to victory. First and foremost, the 
Israelis did not stumble into this urban conflict as they 
had during the hastily executed attack on Suez City, but 
had been planning the operation since 1979. With clear 
objectives outlined in the plan, command and control was 
simplified and understood at the lowest levels. As noted 
earlier, Defense Minister Sharon briefed his commanders 
personally on the operation several times prior to the 
invasion. Sharon stated, " ... I wanted them [commanders] to 
be sure that all the senior and junior officers knew the 
entire scope and meaning of the objectives incorporated in 
the full military plan. I kept nothing back at these 
meetings" (Gabriel, 1984, p. 436). Also, he personally 
visited the battlefield before and during the invasion 
enhancing his battlefield awareness and ability to control 
the situation. His personal involvement and close 
proximity reduced communication problems while increasing 
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the morale of his forces. For example, Sharon visited East 
Beirut to asses the situation, " ... I flew north, intending to 
get a firsthand report from the forward position southeast 
of Beirut ... " He was worried that Israeli positions might be 
overrun. At one point he remarked, "Should wide-scale 
fighting erupt again, the Syrians were in position to 
easily overrun our corridor on the highway. With this as 
background, on the eighteenth I ordered the IDF to prepare 
an attack eastward down the highway" (Gabriel, 1984, pp. 
472, 476). Sharon continually chose such strategic targets 
to attack throughout the siege to include the attack on the 
airport and the final ground assault against PLO 
strongpoints. 
Israeli forces were also reorganized to deal with this 
complex operation. For the first time the IDF developed a 
Corps-level headquarters with centralized C3 and real time 
intelligence links from remote-piloted vehicles (RPV's). 
The Corps headquarters helped to better manage the 
complexities of the operation, reducing control problems 
that were prevalent during the Suez City operation. For 
example, the Corps headquarters reorganized its tactical 
units differently from the attack on Suez City. Combined 
arms teams were organized well in advance and were utilized 
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to attack key strategic centers in the city. The days of 
leading with tanks were over, as paratroop infantry and 
engineer units led the way supported by armored forces and 
massive amounts of indirect fire. This strategic use of 
ground forces coupled with their unique reorganization 
enabled the IDF to conduct successful urban combat with an 
unprecedented low casualty rate of 3%. Also, the Corps 
commander had all Israeli forces under his command, 
eliminating the complex regional command structure seen 
during the Yom Kippur War that caused great delays in 
reassigning units from one command to another. 
The Israelis also made improvements in their 
communications by utilizing E2C command aircraft as mobile 
communications platforms and utilized secure communications 
throughout the invasion. Also, they reduced the enemy's 
ability to communicate by jamming their radar and 
communications centers, which helped establish command of 
the sky (Gabriel, 1984, p. 99). The Israelis conducted an 
extensive psychological warfare campaign by beaming radio 
broadcast at enemy forces telling them that they could 
leave the city safely, which in Gabriel's opinion 
contributed to the PLO's withdrawal rather than their 
fighting to the death (Gabriel, 1984, pp. 137-139). 
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Improvements in C3 were followed by technological 
leaps in ISR. The siege on Beirut saw the first use of 
RPV's by the IDF to jam air defense sights and to provide 
real time intelligence back to Corps headquarters. The use 
of these Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV's) was credited 
with the destruction of the Syrian SAM batteries at no loss 
to the Israeli air force. Had these SAM's not been 
destroyed, they would have provided effective air defenses 
for Beirut and the highway, greatly degrading Israeli close 
air support. This operation insured Israel's air 
superiority in the region and greatly added to the success 
of urban operations. Air superiority further aided the 
overall intelligence effort, as reconnaissance aircraft 
were able to provide early warning of Syrian efforts to 
reinforce. For instance, prior to Israel's occupation of 
the Beirut-Damascus highway, Syrian forces tried to 
reinforce their units in Beirut, but met with disaster: 
Syrian forces in the Bekaa and along the Damascus 
highway couldn't reinforce their units without 
being spotted by Israeli intelligence and 
attacked on the way to the battle area. On a 
number of occasions, Syrian attempts to reinforce 
resulted in large numbers of tanks an APC's being 
destroyed while still on their transporters 
(Gabriel, 1984, p. 120). 
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The ability of Israeli intelligence to provide real time 
data enabled the IDF to further isolate forces in Beirut 
and tighten the siege. 
While overhead imagery is nice to have, there is no 
substitute for human intelligence. The Mossad had 
established long term ties with the Christian movement in 
Beirut and utilized these indigenous forces to provide 
intricate knowledge of enemy positions and camps. 
"Throughout the war, and even before they [Christians] 
provided some intelligence and logistical support ... " 
(Gabriel, 1984, pp. 128-130). Clearly, the ability of the 
IDF to gather and process both electronic and human 
intelligence was much improved over their attempts during 
the Suez City operation where the disposition and location 
of enemy forces was unknown. Improved ISR enabled the IDF 
to fight in a more efficient and effective manner as 
demonstrated by their successes against the SAM batteries, 
their denial of Syrian attempts to reinforce Beirut, and 
their accuracy in locating enemy strongpoints in Beirut. 
The enhanced ISR capabilities noted above improved the 
precision fires employed by the IDF, especially with use of 
RPV's for real time data. There is some controversy 
regarding the character of Israel's fires. Michael Jansen 
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in his book, The Battle of Beirut, characterizes the fires 
employed by the IDF as indiscriminate, causing high 
civilian casualties, while Sharon and Gabriel argue that 
the IDF used restraint and precision when employing fires. 
The facts seem to lie in the middle. There were massive 
amounts of indirect fire and dumb bombs dropped on Beirut, 
causing numerous civilian casualties and collateral damage. 
The Israelis, to their credit, dropped leaflets to warn the 
civilian population to evacuate to safe areas and 
continually left open two passage lanes to allow for 
civilian evacuation; however, approximately 500,000 
civilians remained. Jansen estimates that 5,000 civilians 
were killed up to August 12. While this figure is 
extremely high when viewed independently, the fact is that 
only 1% of the population, according to Jansen's estimates, 
were killed as a result of the siege (Jansen, 1983, p. 24). 
This statistic seems to argue that discretion was used on 
the part of the IDF to limit civilian casualties. One must 
remember that siege warfare involves the civilian 
population and civilians are likely to become casualties. 
The siege saw the first large-scale use of precision 
laser guided munitions that surgically destroyed military 
targets. "Whenever urban areas were under attack, the 
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Israeli air force used either small-charge iron bombs or, 
more commonly, Maverick optically guided missiles, to 
minimize death and destruction ... Because it is deadly 
accurate, it is ideal for hitting selected military targets 
within urban areas ... " (Gabriel, 1984, p. 160). Also, the 
use of real time imagery from RPV's enabled IDF to pinpoint 
military targets, thus avoiding collateral damage. Much of 
the reported damage and casualties seems to have been 
greatly exaggerated. An American delegation of experienced 
combat officers stated that, " ... the Israelis had taken great 
care to minimize civilian casualties and that the damage 
was relatively light" (Gabriel, 1984, p. 122). 
Finally, the IDF employed restrictive rules of 
engagement on its soldiers during urban combat. The 
standard practice of clearing buildings with grenades or 
satchel charges before entering was prohibited in an effort 
to reduce civilian casualties. This practice certainly 
reduced civilian casualties, but as a consequence increased 
Israeli casualties. 
Israel is inherently casualty adverse due to its small 
population. This aversion to casual ties placed the IDF • s 
strategy of reducing civilian casualties in conflict with 
protecting its soldiers, as noted above. How did the IDF 
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employ force protection in urban combat? The IDF utilized 
high volumes of coordinated fires to reduce its casualties. 
Also, Israel's complete air superiority enhanced close air 
support as well as casualty evacuation operations, leading 
to fewer casualties with a better chance at survival due to 
ease of evacuation. 
The IDF medical evacuation system is probably one 
of the most efficiently designed in the world- -a 
reflection of the IDF's sensitivity to the loss 
of human life ... The object is to treat the wounded 
as close to the battlefront as possible prior to 
evacuating them. Israeli experiences have shown 
that if a soldier can be given advanced first aid 
on the spot, his chances of survival are much 
better ... (Gabriel, 1984, pp. 205-206). 
More importantly to the individual soldier than 
medical treatment is the ability to avoid injuries. 
General Dolev, Chief Medical Officer of the IDF, estimated 
that 55% of all casualties were caused by small arms fire. 
The Israelis made extensive use of flak jackets, reducing 
small-arms casualties by an estimated 20%. Also, burn 
casualties were a major problem for the IDF during the 
operation in Suez City. "The Israelis found, however, that 
the severity of burns in this war declined greatly because 
of improved tank design ... the existence of high-technology 
Spectronix fire-suppression systems, and protective 
clothing worn by tankers" (Gabriel, 1984, p. 179). So, 
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technological improvements along with improved medical 
support improved force protection significantly enhancing 
the commanders' ability to sustain effective combat 
operations. 
The IDF also improved its ability to maneuver in urban 
environments compared to the Suez City operation. The 
Israelis adopted a strategy of siege warfare with the 
limited use of strategic assaults as their form of 
maneuver. The PLO and Syrian forces also adopted the 
strategy of siege warfare in an attempt to force Israelis 
into a battle of attrition. However, the Israeli use of 
strategic assaults, precision fires, and an effective 
blockade allowed the Israelis to maintain the initiative, 
while forcing their enemies to withdraw. 
The reorganization of tactical units to operate as 
combined arms teams in urban combat was the most 
significant enhancement that the IDF made in its ability to 
maneuver. Also, the limited use of ground forces against 
strategic locations enabled commanders to sustain the 
operation, while denying the enemy key locations. Rather 
than conducting an all out offensive throughout the city as 
in Suez City, the IDF identified key strategic locations in 
Beirut and systematically secured them. The best example 
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of such a strategic operation was the seizure of the Beirut 
Airport on August 1. The airport represented a strategic 
target for two reasons. First, by securing the airport the 
IDF eliminated an escape route for PLO leadership. Second, 
the airport could provide the Israelis a much-needed 
forward staging base to resupply and evacuate its soldiers. 
The operation was conducted utilizing the combined arms 
teams augmented with elite Golani infantry. Armor and air 
units isolated PLO strongpoints with withering direct fire, 
while supporting fires enabled infantry units to maneuver 
into positions outflanking PLO lines. By the end of the 
day on August 1, IDF forces had captured the airfield and 
pushed PLO forces from their largest base camp in Beirut 
(Gabriel, 1984, pp. 150-151). While Israeli maneuver was 
not characterized by the lightning speed of its past wars, 
the IDF demonstrated its flexibility and patience by 
employing a strategy of siege warfare supported by 
strategic assaults to secure key locations. By selectively 
moving and engaging its units against key strategic 
locations, the IDF retained the initiative, while avoiding 
the pitfalls of attrition warfare characteristic of the 
high casualty producing urban combat environment. 
47 
CONCLUSION 
The Israelis greatly improved their ability to conduct 
urban combat in Beirut compared to their attack on Suez 
City. Improved C3 due to reorganization as well as the 
fielding of new equipment greatly enhanced the commanders' 
ability to command and control his units. The use of 
secure communications along with a centralized Corps 
command made tremendous improvements over C3 during the 
Suez City operation. The first time use of RPV' s yielded 
tremendous results for Israeli intelligence and was key to 
the IDF' s ability to isolate and attack forces in Beirut. 
The use of fires was much more effective due to use of 
precision munitions and real time intelligence from RPV' s. 
Force protection was enhanced through new technologies, the 
reorganization of medical evacuation, and the training of 
combined arms teams in urban combat. The use of these 
combined arms teams to attack strategic locations was the 
key enhancement to maneuver. The improvement over the 
attack on Suez City was simple: armor forces can only play 
a supporting role in urban combat and can not make up the 
majority of the maneuver unit in an urban environment. 




improvements it made in C3, ISR, Fires, Maneuver, and Force 
Protection were key to its success in Beirut and directly 
resulted in their ability to attain a combat efficiency of 
97%. 
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IV CHECHNYA I 
Soviet Tactical Doctrine for Urban Warfare 
Fighting in cities is neither a preferred tactic 
nor strategy for the Soviet armed forces. Soviet 
tactical doctrine, in the broadest sense, 
provides that if possible, the attack or defense 
of cities is to be avoided in warfare (Scharfen 
and Dean, 1975, p. 4). 
THE HORRORS OF URBAN COMBAT 
Russia's war with the breakaway Chechen Republic from 
1994-19996 led to one of the worst defeats ever suffered by 
the Russian military. What were the leading factors that 
resulted in the Russian Army's defeat in Grozny, Chechnya? 
The leading cause for Russia's failure lies in the Army's 
poor state of readiness; however, there were serious 
failures in operational capabilities as well. Also, the 
hastened execution of the operation, brought on by 
political factors, led to many failures in the application 
of the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) . 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
The ~ussians lacked a well-trained joint force capable 
of operating in an urban environment. Therefore, the 
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Russian General staff attempted to force a conventional, 
mass force approach to the Chechen problem in an effort to 
overwhelm their enemy. This approach failed to take into 
account that President Dudayev, Chechen separatist leader, 
lacked the support of the majority of his people and had 
only fragmented support form the military. The massive use 
of force by the Russians against all Chechens, civilians 
and soldiers, solidified Dudayev's support and military 
control, turning what could have been a low intensity 
conflict into an all out war. Clearly the Russian 
leadership failed to identify the Chechen populace as the 
center of gravity in this conflict and hoped that a show of 
mass force would coerce Dudayev and his forces to 
capitulate. In this instance, the Russians' planning for 
the operation failed to conduct proper Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), which led to their 
failure to identify the Chechen populace as the center of 
gravity in this conflict. Proposed JP3-06, Operational 
Concept for Joint Urban Operations, states that, "IPB must 
consider the impact of noncombatants, whose presence in the 
urban area may be substantial and dynamic" (Chapter II p. 
7) . The heavy handed tactics implemented against the city 
of Grozny, from the indiscriminate artillery strikes to 
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conventional bombing sorties, caused numerous civilian 
casualties and enormous collateral damage. These tactics 
violate the operational capability of Fires as defined by 
JP3-06, which requires the fire support system to be 
"extremely precise" so as to reduce collateral damage. 
This misapplication of the principle of Fires by the 
Russians rather than coercing the Chechens into 
surrendering actually managed to strengthen Dudayev's 
support among his people. 
BACKGROUND 
The Chechens have a long history of violent resistance 
against their Russian conquerors, a resistance that has 
recently manifested itself with the battle for Grozny in 
1994-96. The Chechens were annexed in 1859 after bitter 
fighting with Czarist Russia. The Chechens never forgave 
their Russian conquerors for the blood that was spilled. 
The Chechen people continued to resist integration into 
Russian society. The Chechens understood their precarious 
position and patiently awaited the opportunity to rebel 
against a weakened Russian Empire. This opportunity first 
arose during the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920, during which 
the Chechens declared their independence and established a 
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"theocratic democracy," until the Red Army was able to re-
conquer the region. Being a patient people, the Chechens 
continued to resist and await another opportunity. They 
did not have to wait long and found themselves fighting 
against communist Russia alongside Nazi Germany. "For this 
treachery, the entire people was deported to the deserts of 
Central Asia. It is estimated that 30-40% of the 
population died either during transit or in the brutal 
conditions of forced exile." This brutal treatment by 
Russia further solidified the ethnic hatred between these 
cultures and once again the Chechens found themselves 
waiting for another opportunity to throw off the yoke of 
Russian control (Finch, 1996, p.2). 
This opportunity presented itself in November 1991 when 
Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic, grab for 
political power from Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the 
Russian Federation. Yeltsin's appeal was for Soviet 
Republics to declare autonomy; thereby, no longer being a 
burden on the Russian State. Yeltsin declared that Soviet 
republics should "take all the sovereignty they could 
swallow," which led Dudayev to declare Chechen independence 
(Thomas, 1999, p. 89). While Yeltsin's appeal was to 
Soviet Republics, he did not intend for his overtures to 
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include Russian Republics such as Chechnya. Over the 
course of the next two years the impotent Russian State was 
unable to intervene and Dudayev was able to establish 
political control within Chechnya. The issue of Chechen 
independence remained a thorn in the side of President 
Yeltsin and threatened his political career at home. 
Yeltsin responded by declaring a state of emergency on 
November 7, 1991, and deploying an Airborne Brigade to 
capture the airport in Grozny in the hope of coercing the 
Chechen leadership into capitulation. This anemically 
inferior force was rapidly surrounded by numerous Chechen 
National Guard forces and was completely cut off from 
Moscow. Unwilling to take any further drastic measures and 
trying to avoid a slaughter, the Russian Parliament 
rescinded Yeltsin' s state of emerg-ency, thus adverting a 
military disaster at the Grozny airport. Not only did this 
attempt at coercion fail to overawe the Chechen rebels, but 
it also led to the Russians' surrender of all their 
military hardware and supplies garrisoned within Chechnya 
in exchange for freeing the Russian Paratroopers, (Antal, 
1999, pp.29-30). 
Undeterred by his past failures in planning military 
operations, Yeltsin brought matters to a head when his 
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overt coup attempt on November 26, 1994 made up of 
primarily Russian "volunteers" and some Chechen dissidents 
failed. Dudayev paraded 21 Russian soldiers in front of 
the international press and thumbed his nose at Yeltsin' s 
demands for Chechnya's immediate surrender (Antal, 1999, p. 
31) . 
Having learned nothing from their previous military 
embarrassments, President Yeltsin and his Russian Army 
launched an uncoordinated assault to crush Dudayev and his 
followers. 
The indignity and embarrassment over the exposure 
of Russian involvement caused [Yel tsin] ... to order 
troops to start moving into Chechnya on 11 
December. Planners had less than two weeks to 
move and position forces and supplies. By New 
Year's Eve, Russian forces had Grozny surrounded 
on three sides and entered the city from the 
north, moving headlong into hell (Thomas, 1999, 
p. 2) • 
PLANNING THE BATTLE FOR GROZNY 
As Major Finch aptly alludes to in his article Why the 
Russian Military Failed in Chechnya, the haste in which the 
Russians planned and executed the offensive against 
Chechnya, "resulted in considerable confusion in command 
and control which plagued the Russian military throughout 
the entire 21 month conflict ... This lack of preparation 
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resulted in a near knock-out blow to the Russian 
forces ... " (p. 2) . By not taking the time to adequately plan 
for and coordinate the complex operation, the Russians 
doomed themselves to failure. Expectations by Yeltsin and 
Defense Minister Grachev to quickly seize Grozny and 
capture Dudayev in order to avoid a guerrilla war were 
unrealistic. General Grachev sent General Vorobyov, Deputy 
Commander of Russian ground forces, to report on the state 
of military readiness for this operation. General Vorobyov 
reported to Moscow that, "whoever ordered the operation 
should be investigated for criminal irresponsibility," and 
resigned following his report rather than taking command of 
an "unpopular invasion that showed clear signs of imminent 
failure" (Antal, 1999, pp. 32-33). 
The Russian General staff knew that it faced an 
unconventional but well organized enemy; however, the 
timeline forced upon them by Yeltsin and Grachev led them 
to take a conventional approach in the hopes of surprising 
the Chechen rebels with overwhelming force. 
THE INITIAL ASSAULT 
The assault on Grozny was a complex operation due in 
part to two factors. First, Grozny is a rather dispersed 
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city encompassing over 100 square miles with numerous 
multi-story buildings, industrial parks, and a large oil-
refining center. Second, The Russian's plan of attack 
consisted of four simultaneous attacks into and around the 
capital with four groups: Sever, Zapad, Vostok and 
Spetsnaz, rather than simply isolating the city and 
gradually attacking along one axis to secure key objectives 
(Antal, 1999, p. 33). The Russian plan counted on surprise 
and the quick seizure of the city in "one fell swoop." Of 
the 40,000 troops available, only 6,000 actually entered 
the city. How did the Russians expect to attain surprise 
when they had been fighting the Chechen resistance for the 
past two weeks (Thomas, 1999, p. 2)? 
The Chechens were not surprised and defended Grozny 
with approximately 6,000 soldiers along three defensive 
lines, outer, middle and inner. These soldiers occupied 
prepared defensive positions on rooftops and basements in 
order to avoid direct fire from Russian tanks, which were 
unable to elevate or depress their gun tubes to hit these 
defensive positions. The Chechens may have lacked a formal 
standing army, but most of their soldiers and officers 
previously served in the Russian military. These soldiers 
were well disciplined and committed to their cause. The 
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Chechens were ready and "rose up to oppose the Russians ... to 
defend their [Chechen] families and homeland from a 
historic oppressor". (Antal, 1999, pp. 32-34). 
The initial assault began on the night of December 31, 
1994. The 131 st Maikop Brigade met no organized resistance 
and was able to reach the train station, while the rest of 
Group Sever continued on to the presidential palace where 
they halted and awaited further instructions. The men 
remained in their vehicles on this cold night and their 
vehicles remained in column formation "as if they were in a 
motor pool," while the rest of the vehicles were strung out 
along the narrow streets of Grozny all the way back to the 
line of departure. Commanders briefed their soldiers that 
Chechen resistance would dissolve once the objectives were 
secured; therefore, little or no security measures were 
taken. Group Zapad was not as successful and advanced only 
four blocks before it was halted by severe enemy fire. 
Group Vostok moved only a few kilometers before it halted 
for no legitimate reason. Group Spetsnaz landed in the 
mountains in order to support the mechanized drive into 
Grozny, but soon became lost and after several days of 
wandering surrendered to Chechen soldiers (Antal, 1999, pp. 
34-36). This failure to isolate Grozny left the Chechen 
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soldiers' lines of communications and re-supply open as 
well as their avenue of escape. 
On the cold dark morning of January 1, 1995, the 
Chechen soldiers counterattacked. Utilizing innovative 
hunter-killer teams, consisting of 3 men, one sniper to 
provide security, one machine gunner to provide suppressive 
fires, and one anti-tank gunner to destroy Russian 
vehicles, they systematically destroyed Group Sever. Due 
to the Russians' lack of security they were caught totally 
off guard and were virtually annihilated. Of the 1,000 
soldiers of the 131 st Maikop Brigade nearly 800 lost their 
lives and 20 of 26 tanks, 102 of 120 BMP's and other 
armored vehicles were destroyed (Thomas, 1999, p. 2). The 
Maykopskaya Brigade losses were even worse and according to 
one Russian ground commander the brigade, " ... disappeared in 
the fire. The assault forces lost their nerve" (Antal, 
1999, p. 36). 
The final tally of Russian killed and wounded at the 
end of the disastrous initial assault was high. Group 
Sever was virtually annihilated, the elite Spetsnaz Group 
captured, and the moral of the remainder of the assault 
force crushed. Many commanders were relived following this 
disastrous defeat to include Major General Petruk, 
60 
commander of Group Zapad. This obvious attempt to shift 
blame by General Grachev was transparent and according to 
one Russian soldier, " ... the Russian Army was on the verge of 
refusing to obey the ridiculous orders of its commanders 
and the government" (Thomas, 1997, p. 3). 
Control was tenuous at best. 
Command and 
THE FATAL BLOW 
Rather than licking their wounds and regrouping, the 
Russian leadership pressed the attack in an even more 
disastrous fashion. Thoroughly embarrassed by their 
defeat, the Russians lifted all restrictions on fires and 
followed the age-old strategy of "no quarter asked, none 
given." Because the Russians lacked a well-trained 
combined arms team skilled in urban combat, they reverted 
to sheer firepower as the means of bringing the Chechens to 
their knees. Unrestricted bombing began around the clock, 
artillery fire reached a reported 4, 000 rounds per hour, 
and Russian tanks leveled buildings with no regard for 
collateral damage or civilian life. These tactics gained 
Russia control over the charred remains of Grozny, but 
failed to capture Dudayev or bring about a quick end to 
Chechen opposition. In fact, the heavy handed tactics 
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employed by the Russians increased Dudayev's support 
amongst the Chechen population and according to one Russian 
press release guaranteed a long drawn out guerrilla war: 
A guerrilla war in Chechnya has become inevitable 
now. It is no longer Dudayev' s supporters but 
the whole people, the common Chechens that are 
fighting now. Many of them have lost their 
children, wives and mothers, and they are 
prepared to fight for the rest of their life 
[SCI] (Thomas, 1997, p. 22) . 
THE PLANNING PROCESS 
By not taking the time necessary to develop the 
situation, the Russians compounded their initial mistake 
and launched headlong into one bloody defeat after another. 
They failed to take the time to conduct proper ISR 
operations or to utilize the available human intelligence 
to further develop the situation. The hastened attack led 
to shortfalls in C3 and did not provide the necessary time 
to maneuver forces into position to isolate the city. If 
the Russian leadership had taken the time to properly 
analyze the situation rather than rushing their attack 
plans along an unrealistic time line, they could have 
avoided the serious losses sustained in the grueling urban 
combat and possibly have avoided the war altogether. 
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Had the Russians conducted proper IPB, they would have 
found that Dudayev was not the pivotal objective, but 
rather control of the Chechen populace was the real center 
of gravity. The Russians did attempt to use these 
dissidents during the coup attempt; however, the Russians 
failed to unify this support and their heavy-handed tactics 
drove these dissidents to support Dudayev. Once they 
identified that there were large segments of unrest within 
Grozny, they could have used these dissidents to provide 
valuable intelligence and fight against Dudayev, rather 
than relying on a massive show of force to win the war. As 
Major Finch aptly points out in his article Why the Russian 
Military Failed in Chechnya, " ... only a fraction of the 
Chechen population harbored any open hostility toward 
Russian leadership at the onset of hostili ties .. .many 
Chechens supported the early Russian efforts to unseat 
Dudayev. The Chechen president had succeeded in bringing 
the region to the brink of economic collapse." By 
misidentifying the center of gravity, the Russians set out 
on a disastrous course of attrition warfare. 
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THE LACK OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
While the poor state of the Russian Army's readiness 
was the primary cause for the Russian Army's initial 
defeat, the failure of the command structure to 
realistically plan and coordinate this complex operation, 
due in part to political pressures imposed by the Yeltsin 
regime, also contributed significantly to Russia's defeat. 
The lack of coordination and poor planning led to serious 
failures in the operational capabilities of Command, 
Control and Communications (C3); Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance ( ISR) ; and Fires. The Russians' poor 
tactical execution of the assault led to numerous problems 
for the Russian leadership. The most devastating problems 
occurred in C3 and ISR. Earlier we identified and defined 
unity of command as one of the shortfalls within the 
Russian leadership. Lack of command and control cost the 
Russians untold numbers of losses. General Grachev was 
responsible for the overall battle plan, yet he never 
stepped outside of Moscow to analyze the situation. Also, 
he failed to provide unity of command to the ground force 
commander. For example: 
... three powerful ministers (Defense, Internal 
Affairs, and Internal Security) all had troops in 
the fight but failed to integrate their 
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efforts ... ' The enormous losses of the early days 
were caused by the poor level of professionalism 
of the command/ staff element, which 
underestimated the enemy and was staggeringly 
negligent in coordinating actions among 
individual units and subunits' ... " (Thomas, 1999, 
p. 5) • 
As defined in FM 100-5, the principle of Unity of 
Command requires a single commander with the requisite 
authority to employ all forces towards a unified purpose 
and unity of effort for every objective. Unity of command 
within the Russian Army was marginal at the time, due in 
part, to mass resignations, multiple commands, and 
political maneuvering. 
This lack of unity led to a lack of control and the 
inability to establish clear boundaries between units, 
which resulted in several cases of fratricide and incidents 
in which units were pinned down by friendly fire for hours. 
One Russian expert identified the lack of integrated 
communication systems and navigation computers as reasons 
for such friendly fire incidents (Thomas, 1999, p. 8). Had 
the Russians properly planned, coordinated and equipped 
their soldiers, such incidents could have been nearly 
eliminated and great improvements would have been made in 
command and control. 
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Another serious failure in C3 that caused the Russians 
to lose the initiative was the fact that they did not use 
secure communications. "This misstep obviously allowed the 
Chechen force not only to monitor all transmissions and 
thus prepare for what was coming next, but also to insert 
false messages in Russian communications traffic" (Thomas, 
1999, p. 9). This clearly explains the rebels' ability to 
stay one step ahead and their ability to force the Russians 
to react to misinformation. The rapid execution of this 
operation led to inadequate planning for communications 
that caused serious breeches of security, resulting in the 
loss of C3 and was responsible for untold deaths. 
The Russians failed to execute an effective ISR plan. 
Thomas notes this failure as "perhaps the most serious 
deficiency ... The Russians had almost no information about the 
situation in the ci ty ... Reconnaissance was poorly 
conducted ... this shortcoming in the course of combat actions, 
[led] to delays in operations and reduced effectiveness" 
( 19 9 9 1 pp • 5 - 6 ) • This oversight was totally inexcusable, 
because the Russians failed to exploit the human 
intelligence that could have been easily provided from the 
large ethnic Russian population within Grozny, not to 
mention from Chechens who were sympathetic to Russian 
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efforts. Had the Russian leadership taken the time to 
develop an accurate picture of the situation they could 
have easily increased their effectiveness and efficiency, 
not to mention the possibility of averting the whole bloody 
urban conflict. 
The lack of intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) nearly led to the complete destruction 
of Russian forces. FM 100-5 states that, 
Intelligence is fundamental to effective 
planning, security, and deception. Intelligence 
operations are the organized efforts of a 
commander to gather and analyze information on 
the environment of operations and the enemy. 
Obtaining and synthesizing battlefield 
information prior to beginning operations is a 
vital task. Assembling an accurate picture of 
the battlefield requires centralized direction, 
simultaneous action at all levels of command, and 
timely distribution of information throughout the 
command. 
Due to their gross miscalculations on the size and 
capabilities of the Chechen forces, the Russian forces lost 
one third of their fighting force within the first two days 
of battle, a fact which nearly broke the morale of the 
whole Russian Army. 
These shortfalls in acquiring intelligence and 
conducting intelligence operations caused the Russians to 
lose the initiative, which is critical when conducting 
offensive operations. As defined in FM 100-5, 
67 
Initiative sets or changes the terms of battle by 
action and implies an offensive spirit in the 
conduct of all operations. Applied to the force 
as a whole, initiative requires a constant effort 
to force the enemy to conform to commanders' 
operational purposes and tempos, while retaining 
freedom of action. It means depleting the 
enemy's options, while still having options of 
their own. This requires leaders to anticipate 
events on the battlefield so that they and their 
units can act and react faster than the enemy ... 
The lack of an accurate picture of the enemy's 
situation and future intentions left the Russian military 
reacting to Chechen initiatives. Initiative is one of the 
key principles of offensive operations; however, the 
Russians were unable to exploit their force advantages, 
because they always seemed to be one step behind the 
rebels. As stated earlier the Russian plan of attack 
counted on surprise. If surprise was crucial to mission 
success it was ludicrous for the Russian leadership to 
think that they had any hope of attaining surprise after 
they had been actively engaged with Chechen forces for over 
two weeks. Not only were the Chechen forces not surprised, 
they had developed a well-integrated and prepared defensive 
plan. The entrenched rebels easily defeated the mounted 
armored columns of the Russian army. The Russians reliance 
on a mass show of force completely backfired. The lack of 
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a well trained combined arms team to conduct urban combat 
led to the defeat of the initial assault. 
The Russian inability to maneuver in the urban 
environment led them to employ mass fires. As discussed 
earlier, the Russian's misapplication of mass fires 
compounded their failure to defeat Dudayev and "as the war 
and the destruction progressed, the Chechen 
population ... began to consider the Russian military as the 
enemy. In their sloppy attempt at chopping off the head of 
the Chechen leadership, the Russian military ... only agitated 
Dudayev supporters, but also alienated nearly the entire 
Chechen/Russian population" (Thomas, 1997, pp. 5-6). If 
the Russians were able to apply the operational capability 
of precision fires, they could have avoided this collateral 
damage that caused the balance of power to shift in 
Dudayev's favor. 
The loss of international support was another effect 
compounded by the misapplication of mass fires and 
demonstrated the Russians' inability to isolate the area to 
win the information war. Dudayev' s manipulation of the 
international press and the Russian's complete lack of 
"spin control" led to the Chechens' complete victory in the 
media war, which led to international support for their 
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cause in monetary as well as direct military support from 
other Muslim nations. The negative image portrayed on 
international news coverage of the Russian's bombardment of 
Grozny was viewed by the European community as barbaric, 
and led to the Political Council of Europe's decision to 
deny Russia's admission into the Council of Europe (Thomas, 
19 9 7 1 pp • 2 8 - 2 9 ) • Furthermore, economic assistance from 
Europe was postponed during the conflict, which led to 
greater hardships at home for many Russians. 
Poor training, old equipment and lack of technology 
led to poor force protection. Russian mounted forces 
suffered terrible casual ties as RPG' s ripped through the 
hulls of these old vehicles, turning them into burning 
coffins. Also, the lack of navigational computers and the 
lack of C3 led to several cases of fratricide as noted 
above. In order to reduce casualties and fight more 
effectively in the future, the Russian· military will need 
to increase its survivability through better training, 
organization and enhanced equipment. 
CONCLUSION 
While this battle demonstrates that there are several 
required operational capabilities necessary for conducting 
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efficient and effective urban operations, it also 
identified isolating the city and sufficient time for 
planning and coordination as critical requirements 
necessary to conduct successful urban combat. C3 failed to 
provide the commander with the necessary organization, 
authority and communications network that is critical to 
the Joint commander's ability to plan and execute urban 
combat. Second, conducting proper ISR operations are 
imperative throughout the operation. Third, urban combat 
requires well-trained combined arms team to maneuver and 
fight in urban terrain. Fourth, fire support capabilities 
must provide for precision delivery to better support the 
close fight and minimize collateral damage. Finally, 
increased survivability and emphasis on reducing casualties 
through better training and equipment are critical to 
improving force protection capabilities. 
Had the Russian General Staff properly prepared for 
this operation rather than reacting to unrealistic demands 
from political officials, would the result have been any 
different? Certainly they could have used the extra time 
to develop human intelligence assets within the city. 
Also, they could have rehearsed for the operation, giving 
their soldiers the much needed training and cohesion that 
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was absent in the assault force. The extra time to plan 
could have been put to good use in mobilizing the needed 
assets as well as coordinating for the critical 
communications and other combat service support required in 
conducting the operation. While extra time may have 
helped, it is no excuse for the poor state of readiness of 
Russian forces to conduct this operation, especially 
considering the circumstances leading up to the crisis. 
This battle clearly demonstrated the need to isolate 
the urban center in both the physical and electronic sense. 
The lack of physical isolation allowed the Chechens to re-
supply and reinforce, while the lack of electronic 
isolation allowed the Chechens to win the information war. 
After suffering a stinging defeat in Chechnya, would 
the Russians be able to apply solutions to their problems 
to help them fight more effectively in future urban 
conflicts? The following case study on the second campaign 
for Grozny clearly demonstrates that the Russians improved 
their ability to conduct successful urban combat 
operations. 
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V CHECHNYA II 
BACKGROUND 
By leaving the political matter of Chechnya's 
independence unsettled following the expulsion of Russian 
troops from Chechnya in 1996, the Russian government only 
delayed the inevitable. From 1996 until Russian forces 
once again invaded Chechnya in September 1999, Chechnya's 
government continued to push for independence from Moscow. 
The political situation in Chechnya was tenuous as 
President Maskhadov had little authority over the Muslim 
warlords, who maintained true authority via the AK-47. 
Chechnya had deteriorated into a lawless republic 
ruled by large bands of Muslim guerillas. Correspondent 
Holger Jensen states, "Chechnya is not so much a country, 
or a Russian republic, as it is a criminal enterprise. 
Almost everyone is armed and it is often hard to 
distinguish political bosses from mafia bosses. Kidnapping 
for ransom appears to be the only growth industry ... " 
(Jensen, 1999, p. A10). 
In September 1999, the Russian government blamed 
Chechen terrorists for several bomb blasts that rocked 
Moscow's residential neighborhoods, killing about 300 
73 
people. Even though no official evidence was brought 
against Chechnya, the Russian attitude had turned against 
the Chechens due to their wave of kidnappings, border 
incursions, and their claimed linkage to the bomb attacks 
in Moscow. "Unlike the earlier war, the current campaign 
has public support among most Russians. Four September 
apartment bomb blasts that killed 300 people have been 
blamed on Chechen militants, and many say they should be 
destroyed at all costs" ("Russian Troops," 1999). Finally, 
Chechen military incursions into neighboring Dagestan in 
August resulted in the deaths of about 250 Russian soldiers 
and forced the Russian military into action. The 
retaliatory bombing raids against Chechen military targets 
were soon followed by a large-scale military offensive in 
September 1999. 
The Russian campaign to recapture Chechnya bears 
striking resemblance to Israel's war against the PLO in 
1982. Following numerous terrorist attacks and border 
incursions, the Israelis launched retaliatory bombing raids 
against the PLO, followed by a large-scale ground 
offensive. The tactics and reorganization of Russian 
forces also reflect similar changes made by the Israelis. 
Did the Russians borrow a page from the Israel's defense 
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strategy? What did the Russians do differently from their 
failed war in 1996 that led to their successful capture of 
Grozny in 2000? 
THE SECOND CAMPAIGN FOR GROZNY: PHASE I 
After the Russian government successfully gained 
public support for military action against the Chechen 
militants, something the Russians failed to do in the 
previous war, they were able to launch their military 
campaign to recapture Chechnya. Like the Israelis in 1982, 
the Russian government attempted to disguise its objectives 
as retaliatory air strikes intended to deter further 
Chechen attacks. President Putin stated that there would 
be no large-scale invasion. He added, however, 11 certain 
measures will be considered 11 if the air attacks fail to 
deter the Chechens (Jensen, 1999, p. AlO). This initial 
phase of the operation enabled the Russians to strike at 
key military targets with impunity due to their successful 
media campaign characterizing the Chechens as terrorist. 
Also, they were able to use this time to finalize 
preparations for their ground offensive, rather than 
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stumbling into the operation as they had in 1994 without 
proper preparations. 
PHASE II 
The second phase of the operation was smoothly 
executed. Russian forces advanced in a well-coordinated 
attack seizing key villages and strategic locations outside 
of Grozny. The Russians changed their tactics from massive 
frontal assaults that caused numerous casualties during the 
1994-96 war, to the use of precision and massed fires to 
clear areas of enemy resistance prior to occupation. 
Defense correspondent Jonathan Marcus for BBC News states 
that, "The Russian strategy has been to use both fixed-wing 
aircraft and attack helicopters as well as a whole array of 
both towed and self-propelled artillery systems," to fight 
the war at a distance (Marcus, 1999). This strategy of 
fighting the war at a distance took advantage of the 
Russians superiority in firepower, while minimizing the 
disadvantage of having poorly trained troops conducting 
house-to-house fighting. Marcus notes, 
[The] Russian generals are playing to their 
strengths; seeking to use firepower to clear 
areas of Chechen fighters while avoiding the sort 
of close-up infantry combat where the motivation 
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of the Chechens makes them vastly superior to the 
relatively poorly trained Russian conscripts 
(Marcus, 1999). 
This tactic can be directly linked to Russia's success. 
Russian affairs analyst Stephen Dalziel states, "The key 
reason why the operation is going well and is perceived by 
the Russian people to be going well is that casualties for 
the Russian army have been low". He notes that official 
government figures on KIA's up to November 1999 were less 
than 300 (Dalziel, 1999). The second phase of the 
operation was highly successful with low casualties and 
ending with Russian units surrounding the capital in an 
effort to besiege the city of Grozny. 
THE SIEGE OF GROZNY 
The siege of Grozny is a major strategic difference 
between the 1995 and 2000 campaigns. While there are many 
tactical differences from the reorganization of units, C3, 
and maneuver warfare, the strategic difference was the 
ability of Russian forces to isolate and besiege Grozny. 
In 1995 the Russians failed to close off the Southern 
approach to Grozny, allowing Chechen forces to resupply and 
maneuver at will. Also, the Russians failed to isolate 
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communications with Chechnya, leading to Russia's public 
affairs debacle and ultimate loss of support for the war by 
the Russian people. By November 25 1999, CNN reported that 
Russian forces had almost surrounded the capital and were 
"tightening a noose of troops, armor and artillery around 
the town for several weeks" ("Russian Troops," 1999) . They 
also reported that the Russians had cut off electrical 
power in an effort to reduce support for Chechen rebels. 
The Russians were also quick to cut off almost all 
communications with Chechnya, isolating Chechnya in a much 
more effective manner than in 1995. The Russians seemed 
content to wait for opportunities rather than attempting to 
bull their way through the city as they had in 1994-96. 
Daniel Williams, war correspondent, confirmed this strategy 
and stated, "This time, military officials insisted they 
would be more deliberate in their advance on Grozny so as 
to avoid the confusion and casualties that marked the first 
offensive" (Williams, 1999, p. A7). The military 
leadership seemed to have vastly improved their C3 over 
their defeat during the first campaign for Grozny. Russian 
commanding General, Viktor Kazantsev, reiterated that, 
"There will be a planned, prepared operation to liberate 
Grozny" ("Pro-Moscow Chechen," 1999). 
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From December 1999 through early February 2000, the 
Russian military laid siege on Grozny. Like the Israelis 
in 1982, the Russians chose not to engage their enemies on 
a large scale, but utilized specialized, combined arms 
teams to seize strategic locations, such as the train 
station and airport. Enormous barrages and close air 
support preceded these assaults in an attempt to limit 
Russian casualties. Improved reconnaissance efforts 
increased Russian success by identifying enemy positions 
with small recon-teams that drew enemy fire then hit the 
enemy positions with artillery fire. Ruslan Makhmayev, a 
Chechen unit commander in Grozny, said that his most 
devastating losses came from Russian bombing, not direct 
combat. "Russian troops prefer not to engage in close 
combat with us. As soon as a firefight starts, they 
immediately back off and call in aircraft or artillery. 
They prefer to bomb and not to fight" (Nunayev and Paddock, 
2000, p. A1). 
The combination of a well planned and supported 
assault, reorganized combined arms teams, improved ISR, and 
the limited uses of ground forces to capture strategic 
objectives, allowed the Russian military to successfully 
capture Grozny on February 6, 2000. The Russians had an 
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estimated 100,000 troops involved in the siege of Grozny. 
Official casualty reports in late January 2000 estimated 
that 544 soldiers had been killed and another 1,513 wounded 
in the four month campaign, but were later updated on 
January 26 to 1,173 killed with no official report on 
casualties ("Russians Admit," 2000). Taking into account 
that the Russians reported less than 300 KIA'S prior to the 
siege that would place the total KIA's at approximately 900 
for the Grozny area. A soldiers' mothers organization 
refutes these figures and said that at least 3,000 soldiers 
had been killed. Based on independent sources such as 
morgue reports and the number of coffins delivered, the 
higher estimate by the mothers' organization seems to be 
more accurate than the official casualty figures ("Russians 
'Concealing," 2000). Even if we use the higher figure of 
3,000 KIA's and 12,000 wounded (to reflect the 3 to 1 ratio 
of wounded to KIA, reflected in the initial official 
reports) the total casualties would be 15,000 out of a 
force of 100,000, leaving the units at 85% mission capable. 
During the first campaign for Grozny, the Russians 
sustained nearly 50% of its forces killed, wounded or 
captured in the initial assault to capture the city. As 
demonstrated by their ability to purse the Chechen rebels 
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into the mountains, there can be no doubt that the Russian 
units were mission capable and prepared to conduct follow 
on missions. Was Russia's success during this campaign the 
result of improved operational capabilities? 
REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
The Russian military greatly improved its C3 
capabilities. After receiving a briefing at the Army War 
College, New York Times analyst, Steven Myers, reported 
that an American general said, "In this campaign the 
Russians were exhibiting better command and control, 
effectively coordinating complex operations" (Myers, 2000, 
Sec. 4, p. 5). The reorganization of Russian command 
structure added to this efficiency. During the 1994-96 
campaign the command structure was divided between three 
ministries; Defense, Internal Affairs, and Internal 
Security, which each retained C2 over its own tactical 
ground forces. This command structure greatly increasing 
the complexity of planning and executing operations; 
however, the siege of Grozny in 2000 utilized one unified 
commander who exercised tactical control over all the 
forces involved in the campaign. This unified command 
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simplified the whole command structure. Also, the Russian 
General Staff was more unified and aligned with the 
government than during the 1994-96 campaign that saw mass 
resignations from the officer corps. Deputy Chief of 
Staff, General Manilov, stated, "As never before, the state 
and the military are working in concert" ("Generals 
Behind," 2000). This unity was further demonstrated when 
President Putin paid a surprise visit to his troops in 
Chechnya on 1 January 2000, greatly busting the morale of 
his forces. 
The reorganization of tactical units also enhanced 
command and control by providing the commander with 
combined arms units', consisting of infantry, armor, 
engineer, reconnaissance and special forces soldiers, 
capable of conducting the complex tasks associated with 
urban combat. The reorganization eliminated the 
difficulties in controlling ad-hoc units that were thrown 
together during the 1994-96 campaign. 
Communications also seemed to be greatly improved. 
First, their were several reports during the first campaign 
for Grozny outlining the failure of Russian military to 
provide secure communications for its units, resulting in 
the death of numerous soldiers due to the lack of security 
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(Thomas, 1997, pp. 8-9). Chechen rebels were able to 
infiltrate Russian communications to intercept messages and 
insert false messages. During the latest campaign, 
however, there have been no reports of Chechen rebels being 
able to spoof Russian Communications. Also, Chechen rebels 
utilized communications with the Western press to win the 
propaganda war against Russia during the first campaign; 
however, the Russian military was able to effectively 
isolate communications with and win the propaganda war 
against Chechnya during this latest campaign. BBC News 
reported on 22 October 1999 that the Russians had cut off 
almost all communications with Chechnya, ~which makes 
Chechnya much more isolated than ever before" (Waal, 1999) . 
While the Russians still received some political pressure 
from the West, the Russian's ability to present the Chechen 
soldiers as terrorists and the campaign to rid Chechnya of 
these terrorists greatly reduced the political fallout from 
the West. For example, during the first campaign for 
Grozny, the European Union pulled its economic support 
package from Russia in protest; however, no such support 
was withdrawn during the second campaign. 
While vast improvements were made in Russian C3 
capabilities, little evidence indicates that they made such 
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improvements in ISR. The Russians did appear to make 
better use of small reconnaissance teams to locate enemy 
positions; however, these units suffered high casualties as 
a result of their direct probes. According to a press 
report: 
Russian troops trying to edge their way into 
Chechnya's devastated capital Monday met fierce 
resistance from rebels ... The Russian military said 
federal troops were probing rebel positions in 
Grozny with small reconnaissance teams, drawing 
enemy fire to better locate the rebels' defenses 
("Russian Forces," 1999). 
Such probes led to high casualties such as a reported 
"reconnaissance in force operation" in Grozny' s strategic 
Minutka Square, where the press reported that over 100 
Russian soldiers were killed (Williams, 1999, P. A32). 
Major General Shamanov, commander of the Western Group, 
stated that he would continue to use commando and 
reconnaissance troops to infiltrate the city to help 
support his operations (Gordon, 1999, p. A12). This 
account leads one to believe that there was a shortage or 
lack of use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles ( RPV' s) that the 
Israelis used so effectively to help them defeat their 
enemies during the siege of Beirut. Improvements were made 
in the use of human intelligence, as the Russians did 
utilize Chechen militia to spearhead many of their assaults 
84 
into Grozny. The militia's knowledge of the area provided 
the commander better situational awareness. However, if 
the above casualty report is accurate, it would represent 
nearly one third of total KIA's for the battle for Grozny. 
Clearly, more improvements are needed in Russian ISR 
capabilities in order to bring down the casualty rate. 
More improvements also seem to be needed in the 
Russian's indirect fire capabilities as well. While they 
improved their strategy of employing long range fires to 
reduce known enemy targets, improvements in technology 
seemed to be lacking. "This grueling form of combat has 
seen few innovations. Most of the Russian weaponry used is 
well-known from earlier campaigns" (Marcus, 1999). 
Russian officers complained about the outdated munitions 
being used. A Lieutenant Colonel stated, "It's useless to 
pound the rebels with shells dating back to 1952 ... These 
shells produce only noise and have very little destructive 
power. I haven't seen newer shells, say at least from the 
1980s used here" ("Chechens Use," 2000). However, there 
are reports that the Russians were stepping up their use of 
precision munitions and deploying their most recent attack 
helicopter, KA-50, in support of operations (Marcus, 1999). 
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Also, the Russians employed tanks and multi-barreled anti-
aircraft guns in the direct fire mode with good success. 
Collateral damage was high due to the nature of long 
range bombardment; however, the Russians employed two 
tactics to counter the negative effects of the collateral 
damage. First, Russian troops struck deals with various 
towns giving the towns amnesty from attacks for their 
promise not to support Chechen rebels. A Russian Colonel 
who was an infantry commander, stated that his troops had a 
great advantage over the last war: 
The support of villagers. Towns that refused to 
take in rebel fighters were spared bombardment, a 
fact made clear by a ride on a BMP-2 troop 
carrier ... To the left was a train station and a 
cluster of houses, all destroyed, where the 
Chechens had taken up positions. To the right 
was the unscathed village of Tsentora-yurt, which 
made a deal with the army (Filipov, 1999, p. 
A12). 
By striking such deals, the Russians avoided the public 
relations disaster that they had during the first campaign 
and presented themselves as compassionate towards the 
Chechen civilians' plight. Second, the Russians, like the 
Israelis in 1982, maintained two corridors to evacuate 
civilians from the city of Grozny, and even suspended the 
bombardment during certain hours to facilitate their safe 
passage. For example, "Russian forces had suspended air 
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and artillery attacks against the city to encourage 
civilians to flee. But to keep up military pressure on the 
Islamic militants there, the Russians now intend to stop 
the bombardment for several hours a day and then start up 
their attacks again" (Gordon, 1999, p. A12). 
Improvements in tactical employment, the use of small 
numbers of precision munitions, and the granting of amnesty 
that reduced collateral damage helped improve Russian 
fires. However, the use of old munitions and massed 
indirect fires caused enormous collateral damage. Overall, 
the Russian's ability to utilize effective fires improved 
during this campaign. For example, the Russians lured the 
rebels into a trap by pretending to give the rebels a map 
containing the routes through the minefields surrounding 
Grozny in exchange for $100,000. When the trap was sprung, 
the rebels were caught in the middle of the minefield and 
were hit with intensive artillery barrages, resulting in 
over 600 rebels killed or severally wounded to include 
several top warlords (Turpalov, 2000, p. lA). During this 
campaign, coordinated fires improved, helping to reduce 
Russian casualties by clearing enemy areas of any 
significant resistance; however, improvements in precision 
fires appear to be minimal. 
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While only minimal improvements were made in the 
Russian's fire capability, they did make significant 
improvements in their maneuver capabilities. The most 
dramatic difference between the two campaigns is the type 
of maneuver employed. During the first campaign, the 
Russians choose to use a show of force, driving their 
vehicles in column formation into downtown Grozny. The 
results were disastrous with an entire regiment destroyed 
in the first day of battle. The Russians continued to use 
frontal assaults throughout the campaign, leading to high 
casualties. The Russians improved their ability to 
maneuver from the first campaign, and like the Israelis in 
1982, the Russians choose to engage enemy forces from a 
distance and laid siege to Grozny. General Kazantsev, 
Russian military commander in Chechnya, stated that the 
move into Grozny would be deliberate so as to avoid the 
confusion and massive amounts of casualties sustained in 
the first campaign (Williams, 1999, p. A7). He also 
stated, in an earlier interview, "There will be a planned, 
prepared operation to liberate Grozn~ ("Pro-Moscow 
Chechen," 1999) . This approach to liberating Grozny led to 
strategic attacks against key centers such as the airport, 
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the train station, and the strategically important Minutka 
Square that controlled the center of the city. 
Improvements were also made in the reorganization of 
Russian tactical units into combined arms teams with 
special operation forces and Chechen militia spearheading 
the assaults. According to Jonathan Marcus, defense 
analyst for the BBC News: 
This time the Russians have taken a much more 
cautious approach, relying upon long-range 
artillery and air power to soften up Chechen 
resistance. Lighter, more maneuverable armored 
vehicles are in the vanguard with self-propelled, 
multi-barreled, anti-aircraft cannons proving 
themselves an ideal weapon for city fighting 
(Marcus, 2000) . 
General Shamanov, commander of Western Group, disclosed 
that he would conduct reconnaissance and special operations 
to infiltrate the city. He said, "We will try to establish 
a foothold on the outskirts and get the civilians out by 
military transport. After they are out, reconnaissance and 
other special operations will be carried out over two to 
three weeks" (Gordon, 1999, p. A12). 
These improvements in maneuver were key to Russian's 
success in capturing Grozny. The increased lethality and 
survivability of the reorganized units were crucial to 
capturing the strategic centers in Grozny. Long-range 
fires combined with strategic assaults were the backbone to 
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Russian improvements in maneuver and led to far fewer 
casualties than in the first campaign. 
Improvements in force protection also helped lead to 
Russia's success. Casualty aversion by the Russian 
military was a significant factor during this campaign. 
Major General Scales, commander of the Army War College, 
said, "This concern over casualties, which badly eroded 
public support during the first war, has been one of the 
most striking changes in Russian military doctrine in 
decades, showing a new sensitivity to the military's need 
for civilian backing" (Myers, 2000, Sec. 4, p. 5). Russian 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev placed the need for reduced 
casualties over the stringent timelines that the old 
Russian military were used to. He said, "The goal was not 
to meet any particular deadline, but to completely 
eliminate the rebels and minimize casualties among Russian 
solders" ("Chechen Snipers," 2000). During the first 
campaign, the pressure from the government to meet 
timeliness caused enormous casualties due to the lack of 
time to make proper preparations. With the Russian 
military and government's realization that the need to 
reduce casualties was greater than meeting unrealistic 
timelines, they were able to greatly reduced casualties 
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l 
from the first campaign for Grozny. In order to reduce 
casualties, Moscow passed a law providing amnesty to any 
rebel who surrendered by February l(Gordon, 1999, p. A12). 
The Russian military also used a policy of granting amnesty 
to villages who refused to support the rebels, which not 
only reduced Russian casualties, but also reduced 
collateral damage to these areas as noted above. 
Improvements in Force Protection were seen in the 
Russians' employment of lighter more maneuverable armored 
vehicles to include improved direct fire support provided 
by multi-barreled anti-aircraft guns. These vehicles 
increased the lethality needed by units in direct contact 
and the vehicle's increased maneuverability increased their 
survivability and reduced casualties. Russian special 
operation forces were equipped with flak jackets, adding to 
their survivability. Russians also utilized low-tech 
methods to increase survivability such as painting numbers 
on their uniforms to help identify friendly forces from 
rebel forces, who sometimes wore Russian uniforms ("Assault 
on Grozny," 1999). 
Increased emphasis from the chain of command, 
improvements in technology, providing necessary equipment 
to soldiers, and low-tech methods all helped improve 
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Russia's force protection capabilities and helped lead to 
their success. 
CONCLUSION 
The Russians definitely improved their ability to 
successfully conduct urban combat from their first campaign 
in Grozny. Great improvements were made in C3 from the 
reorganization of command to more secure communications as 
well as the isolation of Chechen communications. Maneuver 
capabilities also saw dramatic improvements. The 
reorganization of tactical units and the use of strategic 
assaults were essential to Russia's success. Enhancements 
in force protection increased soldiers survivability and 
reduced casualties leading to greater support from the 
Russian people, something the first campaign lacked. While 
there were improvements made in ISR and fires capabilities, 
these improvements did not seem to lead to dramatic changes 
from the first campaign and were marginal in leading to 
Russia's success. The one exception was the strategic use 
of long-range fires to reduce enemy positions. While these 
fires created enormous collateral damage, they did reduce 
Russian casualties. The key to making their fires more 
92 
effective in the future will be Russia's ability to provide 
precision fires. Clearly the great improvements that the 
Russian's made in C3, maneuver and force protection, and to 
a lessor degree the marginal improvements in fires and ISR, 
directly led to their success against the Chechen rebels. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
The final analysis of the individual case studies 
reveals that by improving their Required Operational 
Capabilities (ROC's), both the Russians and the Israelis 
conducted successful urban combat. The ROC's were crucial 
to the success of the mission. However, while it is not 
necessary for a unit to be trained in all aspects of the 
ROC's in order to succeed, the Beirut case study clearly 
demonstrated that if a unit is well trained it will greatly 
increase its efficiency and reduce its casualties. The 
following diagram outlines the Russians' and Israelis' 
status on the ROC's. 
Table 1. Analysis of Required Ope rational Capabilities 
ROC Suez City 1973 Beirut 1982 Groz ny 94-96 Grozny 99-00 
C3 Untrained Trained Untr ained Trained 
Man Untrained Trained Untr ained Trained 
ISR Untrained Trained Untr ained Practice 
Fires Practice Trained Prac tice Practice 
FP Practice Trained Prac tice Trained 
The analysis of C3 proved that it was one of the most 
crucial elements in reducing casualties and increasing 
overall combat effectiveness. Clearly the lack of 
centralized command during the first Grozny campaign and 
the battle for Suez City, led to horrendous casualties due 
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to the disorganization of the Russian and Israeli forces 
respectively. The reorganized units and centralized 
command structures utilized by the Russian's and Israeli's 
during the second Grozny campaign and during the siege of 
Beirut greatly enhanced the C2 of the commander and 
dramatically reduced casualties. Finally, improved 
communications also led to greater success. The use of 
secure communications was crucial to the Russian's and 
Israeli's success in urban combat, while the lack of secure 
communications directly resulted in their failure to 
conduct successful urban combat due to the loss of surprise 
and initiative. 
Being able to maneuver in urban terrain is also 
crucial to successful urban operations. The ability to 
maneuver in urban terrain improved dramatically for both 
the Russians and Israelis. Both forces reorganized their 
tactical units from large armor heavy forces, used in the 
initial battles, to smaller more agile combined arms units 
used in the final battles. Also, the manner in which these 
units were employed changed dramatically as well. The 
efficient strategic assaults of the second Grozny campaign 
and the siege of Beirut replaced the disastrous frontal 
assaults of the first Grozny campaign and the battle for 
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Suez City. These smaller and more agile combined arms 
teams had greater lethality and were able to move more 
rapidly than the larger conventional armored task force. 
The selective strategic use of forces allowed commanders to 
retain the initiative while remaining engaged, but also 
reduced the high casualties of the unsuccessful massive 
frontal assaults. 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
operations are the backbone to planning urban operations. 
The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is 
crucial to the commander's understanding of the 
environment, terrain and enemy situation. The lack of ISR 
led to the dramatic initial defeats sustained by the 
Russian's and Israeli's during the first Grozny campaign 
and the battle for Suez City respectively. Subsequently, 
the Israelis greatly improved their ISR operations with 
both increased HUMINT and the use of RPV's and thus 
dominated the intelligence field and provided key 
information leading to Israel's success during the siege of 
Beirut. The Russians, on the other hand, only marginally 
improved their ISR capabilities. They did improve their 
use of HUMINT, but lacked remote sensors to locate enemy 
positions. They were forced to utilize small 
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reconnaissance teams to draw enemy fire in order to locate 
enemy strong points. While this tactic enabled the 
Russians to locate enemy positions, it resulted in high 
casualties reducing overall combat effectiveness. 
Coordinated, precision fires greatly add to the 
effectiveness of combat forces in urban combat. Both the 
Russians and Israelis lacked a well-coordinated and precise 
fire support capability during the first Grozny campaign 
and the battle for Suez City respectively. The Israelis 
did manage to improve their coordination and provided high 
volumes of close air support during combat operations with 
high precision during their siege on Beirut. The Russians 
were not able to provide improvements in precision to a 
great extent, but they did provide high volumes of well-
coordinated intensive fires during combat operations. The 
Russians countered their lack of precision by isolating the 
battlefield from reporters, which enabled the Russians to 
engage in such bombardments with little political fallout. 
Their failure to do so in the first campaign led to 
enormous political pressure from the west to pull out and 
ultimately resulted in the loss of the Russian people's 
support. So, while the US certainly aspires to a higher 
standard of precision fires to reduce collateral damage, 
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there are other means, as the Russian showed, to reduce the 
fallout from mass bombardments. 
Reducing casual ties by in,creasing force protection 
helped lead to successful urban combat. The most notable 
improvement in all the case studies was the paradigm shift 
of the Russian military to avoid casualties. This enabled 
the.Russians to maintain popular support for the offensive 
and increased their overall combat effectiveness by 
reducing casualties. The use of body-armor helped 
dramatically reduce casualties due to fragmentation. Also, 
the use of more maneuverable vehicles with improved armor 
led to increased lethality while reducing the casualties of 
mounted forces. Improved C3 along with visual 
identification markers reduced friendly fire casualties. 
By protecting the combat force, all these improvements 
helped lead to the success of both the second Grozny 
campaign and the siege of Beirut. 
There was another critical element that the analysis 
of these four case studies identified as crucial to 
successful urban combat, the ability to isolate the urban 
center. The first campaign for Grozny and the battle for 
Suez City demonstrated that by not isolating the urban 
center, the enemy was able to reinforce and maneuver more 
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freely; thus, thwarting attacks on the urban center. Also, 
the first campaign for Grozny and the siege on Beirut 
demonstrated the need to isolate enemy communications in 
order to win the propaganda war. The Russian's inability 
to isolate Chechen communications with the West directly 
led to the growing disfavor of the war and ultimately led 
to the Russians' withdrawal. However, the Russians greatly 
improved their ability to isolate enemy communications in 
the second campaign, which led to Russia's propaganda 
victory and the eventual successful campaign. While the 
Israelis conducted a nearly flawless campaign in Beirut, 
their inability to isolate enemy communications led to 
extreme political pressures from the US to end the 
conflict, causing untold stress on the Israeli leadership. 
Had the Israelis countered the enemy~s propaganda or 
isolated the enemy's communications, they could have 
greatly reduced these political pressures and been able to 
better focus their attention on the siege. The ability to 
effectively physically isolate the urban center in the 
battle for Beirut and the second campaign for Grozny were 
crucial to setting up an effective siege that led to the 
Israeli's and Russian's victory respectively. The major 
tactical differences between the failure to conduct 
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successful urban combat and the ability to conduct 
successful urban combat in these case studies was the 
ability of the attacker to isolate and lay siege to the 
city. 
Finally, sufficient time for planning was another 
major asset needed to conduct successful urban combat. The 
ability to properly prepare and plan for urban operations 
was an essential element that led to the successful second 
campaign for Grozny and the siege of Beirut. Conversely, 
the hastily prepared and planned attacks of the first 
campaign for Grozny and the battle for Suez City directly 
led to their failures. 
The proper execution of the ROC's were critical to 
conducting successful urban combat; however, without 
properly planning and coordinating for the complex task of 
urban operations or without properly isolating and laying 
siege to the city, successful urban operations cannot be 
conducted. 
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